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I INTRODUCTION 
Women, girls, men and boys all suffer when exposed to the effects of conflict. Sometimes 
women and girls have similar experiences in these situations as men and boys. Many times, 
however, they have different experiences. They may be subjected to different violations 
because they are women and girls, or they may be subjected to the same type of violations as 
men and boys, but experience or perceive these harms in a different manner. One obvious 
example is sexual violence committed during war: “[s]exual violence, and the long shadow 
of terror and trauma it casts, disproportionately affects women and girls.”1 This different 
female experience stems from pervasive global gender inequality: around the world, women 
and girls tend to be poorer and receive less education, and are often less mobile as a result of 
traditional family and caregiving responsibilities, all of which negatively compound their 
experiences during conflict.2 While women and girls may have common experiences based 
on their gender, sometimes girls suffer additional targeted harm as a result of their young 
age. For example, girls forcibly recruited to serve as fighters may serve in combat and as 
scouts (like boys), but may also be subjected to sexual slavery and conjugal slavery (unlike 
boys).3 
When women and girls fleeing conflict become asylum-seekers, are their gender-
differentiated experiences recognized by decision-makers? It is not immediately obvious that 
they would be, given that neither the terms ‘sex’ nor ‘gender’ appear in the definition of 
‘refugee’ set out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by 
the 1967 Protocol4 (the ‘Refugee Convention’ or ‘Convention’).5  However, over the past 
                                                 
1  Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Conflict-related sexual violence,’ 13 January 2012, 
S/2012/33, para. 6.  
2 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Concept Note: General Discussion on 
the protection of women’s human rights in conflict and post-conflict contexts’, 18 July 2011, available online 
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/GRConceptNote.pdf, 6-7. 
3 These views were provided by Radhika Coomaraswamy, United Nations Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, as expert evidence in: Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Transcript ICC-01/04-01/06-T-223-ENG, 7 
January 2010, 29 line 25 and 30 lines 1-9. 
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee 
Convention) [Refugee Convention]; Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (entered into force 4 October 
1967) 606 UNTS 267 (Protocol) [Refugee Protocol]. The Refugee Convention recognizes as refugees persons 
who, “owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion” are outside the country of his or her 
nationality and are unable or, owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that 
country, .Art. 1A(2), as amended by Art. 1(2) of the 1967 Protocol, Refugee Protocol. 
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twenty years, there has been a significant focus at the international level on ensuring a 
gender-sensitive interpretation of the refugee definition. A sampling of these efforts includes 
the issuance by UNHCR of a number of groundbreaking guidance documents, such as the 
1991 “Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women” (updated in 2008),6 the 1995 “Sexual 
Violence Against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and Response” (updated in 2003),7 the 
2002 “Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution” 8  and various Conclusions by the 
Executive Committee.9 “[I]n recognition of the fact that women refugees often experience 
persecution differently from refugee men”,10 various States have adopted guidelines on 
female asylum-seekers, such as Australia,11 Canada,12 the Netherlands,13 Norway,14 South 
Africa,15 the United Kingdom16 and the United States.17 Some States take a different approach 
and have included ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ in the list of Convention grounds in their domestic 
legislation.18  
                                                                                                                                                 
5 On the history of this, see A. Edwards, ‘Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with International 
Refugee Law and Policy 1950-2010’ (2010) 29(2) Refugee Survey Quarterly 21, 22-23. 
6 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women,’ July 1991, UN Doc. EC/SCP/67, paras 54-56 
and 59-60 [UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women’]. These guidelines were updated in 
2008. See UNHCR, ‘Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls’, January 2008, available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47cfc2962.html [UNHCR, ‘Handbook’]. 
7 UNHCR, ‘Sexual Violence Against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and Response’, 8 March 1995, 
available online at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b33e0.html , 3; UNHCR, ‘Sexual and Gender-
based Violence Against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Guidelines on Prevention 
and Response’ (May 2003), available online at http://www.unhcr.org/3f696bcc4.html.  
8 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No.1 – Gender-Related Persecution within the context of 
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’, 7 May 2002, 
HCR/GIP/02/01, available online at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36flc64.html, para. 6 [UNHCR, 
‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution’]. 
9 E.g., UNHCR ExCom,  ‘Refugee Women and International Protection’, 18 October 1985, Conclusion No. 39 
(XXXVI) 1985, available online at http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c43a8.html, para. (k); UNHCR ExCom, 
‘Refugee Protection and Sexual Violence’, 8 October 1993, Conclusion No. 73 (XLIV) 1993, available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c6810.html [UNHCR ExCom, ‘Refugee Protection’]. 
10 UNHCR ExCom, Refugee Protection, note 9 above, para. (e). 
11  Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision Makers 1996 (Australia) and Gender Guidelines 2012 
(Australia). 
12 Guidelines for Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution 2003 (Canada) [Canada, 
‘Guidelines for Women Refugee Claimants’]. 
13 Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 2000 (Netherlands). 
14 Guidelines – Persecution for Other Reasons 1998 (Norway). 
15 Gender Guidelines for Asylum Determination 1999 (South Africa). 
16 Asylum Gender Guidelines 2000 (United Kingdom) and Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim 2006 (United 
Kingdom). 
17 Considerations for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims From Women 1995 (United States) and 
Gender Guidelines for Overseas Refugee Processing 2000 (United States). 
18 Refugee Act 1996 (Ireland), s. 1 (in defining membership of a particular social group); and Refugee Act 
1998 (South Africa), ch. 1(1), also defining membership of a particular social group. Spain’s Equality Act 
(2007) included within the definition of ‘refugee’ “foreign women who are fleeing from their countries of 
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Given all of this guidance, one would expect a gender-sensitive determination of asylum 
claims by women and girls fleeing conflict. However, numerous studies show that there are 
still deep flaws in the domestic consideration of refugee claims by women and girls, and a 
need for improvement in both policy and practice. 19  To date, this analysis has not 
concentrated specifically on women and girls who have fled conflict. This paper therefore 
aims to bring some preliminary focus to this sub-set of female refugee claimants, by asking 
three interrelated questions. The first question is: can violence directed against women and 
girls during conflict ever be described as indiscriminate (and therefore not persecutory for 
the purposes of the Refugee Convention)? The second question is: on what legal basis, if any, 
could a woman or girl fleeing conflict meet the definition of ‘refugee’? The final question is: 
what problems do women and girls fleeing conflict face when making refugee claims, and 
are these problems different from those faced by female claimants fleeing peacetime ill-
treatment?  
This paper begins by clarifying the methodology and scope of the paper, as well as key 
concepts used throughout. Part 2 of this study sets out the character and effects of conflict on 
women and girls, especially the physical, psychological, social and economic experiences 
that may differ from those of men and boys. By examining potential commonalities in female 
experiences of conflict, this Part endeavors to demonstrate that the so-called ‘indiscriminate’ 
nature of ill-treatment in conflict may not be so indiscriminate after all. Part 3 explores when 
conflict-related ill-treatment has been recognized as persecution, and when it has not, 
                                                                                                                                                 
origin due to a justified fear of suffering persecution on the grounds of gender” at 65: Constitutional Act 
3/2007 of 22 March for effective equality between women and men (Organic Law 3/2007), 2007 (Spain) 
[Spain, Equality Act]. For additional examples, see: A. Edwards, ‘Age and Gender Dimensions in 
International Refugee Law’, in E. Feller, V. Turk and F. Nicholson, eds., Refugee Protection in International 
Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 56 at n. 50 [Edwards, ‘Age and Gender Dimensions’]. 
19 E.g., C. Querton, ‘’I Feel Like as a Woman I’m Not Welcome’: A Gender Analysis of UK Asylum Law, 
Policy and Practice’, Asylum Aid, January 2012, available online at 
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/pages/i_feel_like_as_a_woman.html [Querton, ‘I Feel Like’]; H. Muggeridge 
and C. Maman, ‘Unsustainable: The Quality of Initial Decision-Making in Women’s Asylum Claims’, 
Asylum Aid, January 2011, available online at 
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/data/files/unsustainableweb.pdf [Muggeridge and Maman, ‘Unsustainable’]; 
H. Cheikh Ali, C. Querton and E. Soulard, ‘Gender-Related Asylum Claims in Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis of Law, Policies and Practice Focusing on Women in Nine EU Member States’, GENSEN, May 
2012, available online at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/data/files/Gender-
related_asylum_claims_in_Europe.pdf [Cheikh et al.]; Human Rights Watch, ‘Fast-Tracked Unfairness: 
Detention and Denial of Women Asylum Seekers in the UK’, 2010, available online at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/uk0210webwcover.pdf [HRW, ‘Fast-Tracked’]; and UNHCR, 
‘Improving Asylum Procedures - Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law and Practice: Key 
Gender Related Findings and Recommendations’, March 2010, available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4be01ed82.html [UNHCR, ‘Improving Asylum Procedures – 
Gender’]. 
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thereby beginning the discussion of the legal basis on which a woman or girl fleeing conflict 
can meet the definition of ‘refugee’. The issue of whether ill-treatment in conflict can be 
considered to be targeted at individual women and girls is also examined. Part 4 examines 
the Convention grounds most often used in refugee claims made by women and girls fleeing 
conflict, according to the case set described in section 1.1. below: membership of a particular 
social group, political opinion, race and religion. Part 5 discusses how lack of State 
protection has been considered in female conflict-related refugee claims. Part 6 discusses 
procedural and evidentiary problems that arise in asylum claims by women and girls fleeing 
conflict, especially with respect to credibility gaps on sexual violence and lack of gender-
specific country of origin information. Part 7 ends with concluding observations on the 
themes raised by the questions above: first, the need for a deeper understanding of 
persecution; second, the need for expanded conceptions of the Convention grounds as they 
relate to women and girls fleeing conflict; and third, that women and girls fleeing conflict 
face problems similar to those making peacetime-related claims, but also face specific 
conflict-related evidentiary and procedural hurdles.  
1 METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE 
This paper explores how refugee adjudicators have considered cases involving women and 
girls who have fled conflict, or whose claims relate to conflict, mainly through an 
examination of 46 cases decided between 2004 and 2012 in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. These cases involve Afghanistan, Angola, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Guinea, Iraq, Palestine, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Serbia, 
Somalia, Sri Lanka and Uganda. These cases come from various levels of the refugee 
determination process, from initial determinations to final appeals. All of the cases have 
some relation to conflict. Some are directly about women and girls fleeing the effects of 
conflict that had spread to the area in which they were living. Others are about actions of 
parties to a conflict. Yet others are about ongoing violence that was predated by an armed 
conflict and may or may not be considered an armed conflict at the date of the refugee 
determination, but which nonetheless come close to the international humanitarian law 
(IHL) threshold of armed conflict. This latter group was included because these cases were 
considered to provide helpful insight into how refugee claims by women and girls are 
similar in both armed conflict and other situations of violence below the IHL threshold of 
armed conflict. 
Each of these 46 cases were analyzed so as to identify: whether the conflict figured 
prominently or not in the discussion of the refugee claim; the Convention ground(s) 
considered and whether those ground(s) related either explicitly or inherently to gender; 
  
8 
 
whether gender was considered in the discussion of past and/or potential future persecution; 
whether there were any gender-related procedural issues; and whether there were any 
gender-related evidentiary issues (for example, with respect to country of origin 
information). In addition to these 46 cases, this paper also refers to a number of other cases 
involving female claimants coming from countries involved in conflict. These additional 
cases are usually from other jurisdictions or outside of the time period of the case set, and 
are used to illustrate key points. This study places the examination of case law within the 
larger discussion by international organizations (including UNHCR), nongovernmental 
organizations, scholars and others on the determination of refugee claims by women and 
girls and the consideration of gender-based persecution within international refugee law. 
While the focus of this paper is on the juncture of (part of) gender20 and conflict, the rich 
literature on the wider issues of female refugee claims and on gender-based persecution is 
necessarily important: the barriers faced by women and girls making claims based on 
conflict are a subset of the difficulties many female claimants have, regardless of the reason 
for their flight. 
Finally, it is important to note that there is relatively little existing published research 
specifically on the lessons to be learned about female refugee claims stemming from conflict 
and, as a result, this study is necessarily preliminary in nature. The scholarship on gender-
related asylum claims tends to focus on female claims of female genital mutilation, forced 
marriage, domestic violence, ‘honour’ crimes, rape and other forms of sexual violence, 
trafficking into forced prostitution or forced labour, forced sterilization or forced abortion, 
and transgression of social mores, or both male and female claims related to sexual 
orientation and gender identity.21 Within these categories, conflict tends only to be discussed 
in relation to refugee claims based on sexual violence. While an examination of sexual 
violence is important, it usually does not represent the totality of the female experience of 
conflict.  
This paper does not focus on gender issues raised in refugee claims by men and boys fleeing 
armed conflict, though these are important and often overlooked issues that require further 
                                                 
20 It is important not to elide women and girls with the term ‘gender’: see the discussion of terminology in 
section 1.2. 
21 E.g., K. Musalo, J. Moore and R. Boswell, Refugee Law and Policy: A Comparative and International Approach 
(Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 4th ed., 2011), 689-820 considers repressive social norms, 
rape, female genital cutting (FGC), and persecution to others (such as FGC) as persecution to self; H. 
Crawley, Refugees and Gender: Law and Process (UK: Jordan Publishing Ltd., 2001), 79-198, covers women’s 
political participation, gendered social mores and the concept of ‘honour’, violence within the family, 
reproductive rights including forced sterilization and abortion, sexual orientation and female genital 
mutilation. 
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study. 22  This paper also does not explore exclusion under Article 1(F) of the Refugee 
Convention. This paper also does not discuss the potential or actual implications of the 
broader refugee definitions at the regional level for women and girls claiming asylum from a 
situation involving armed conflict. Finally, it does not discuss the issue of subsidiary or 
complementary protection for women and girls fleeing conflict.23 
2  TERMINOLOGY AND CONCEPTS  
This study uses the term ‘gender’. Since the term tends to be misused at the international 
level as a synonym for ‘women’ or ‘female’ only,24 it is important to be clear in its meaning. 
UNHCR has defined ‘gender’ as “the relationship between women and men based on 
socially or culturally constructed and defined identities, status, roles and responsibilities that 
are assigned to one sex or another.”25 Even though gender is a societal or cultural norm, it is 
not static or innate and its meaning can change over time.26 While gender norms may evolve 
over generations, sometimes they can change very quickly, including during times of great 
upheaval, such as during conflict.27 Since this paper focuses on the experiences of female 
refugee claimants fleeing conflict, it will mostly be discussing socially- or culturally-
constructed gender norms of femaleness, often perceived in contradistinction to social and 
cultural norms around maleness.  
This paper also uses the terms ‘sexual violence’ and ‘gender-based violence’. Sexual violence 
is a form of gender-based violence. Conflict-related sexual violence has been described as 
“acts of sexual violence that are linked with military/political objectives and that serve (or 
intend to serve) a strategic aim related to the conflict.”28 Sexual violence is also considered to 
                                                 
22 Edwards, ‘Transitioning Gender’, note 5 above, 40-44. 
23 This requires more study, as subsidiary/complementary protection status is sometimes used as a ‘safety 
valve’ for gender cases, avoiding the gender analysis on Convention grounds, thus subverting the primacy 
of the Convention grounds: Cheikh et al., note 20 above, 57. 
24 H. Charlesworth, ‘Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United 
Nations’ (2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 1, 14-15. 
25 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution’, note 8 above, para. 3. 
Other parts of the United Nations have adopted similar definitions: e.g. UNICEF, UNFPA, UNDP and UN 
Women, ‘Gender Equality, UN Coherence & You: Glossary’, available online at 
http://www.unicef.org/gender/training/content/resources/Glossary.pdf. 
26 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution’, note 8 above, para. 3. 
27 For example, in some cases, women are recruited into resistance groups and acquire rights and status as 
fighters that they had never previously enjoyed: J. G. Gardam and M. J. Jarvis, Women, Armed Conflict and 
International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001), 50. Unfortunately, these changes in gender 
norms often disappear post-conflict: ibid., 51. 
28 United Nations Department of Political Affairs, ‘Guidance for Mediators: Addressing Conflict-Related 
Sexual Violence in Ceasefire and Peace Agreements’, January 2012, available online at 
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be linked to conflict when it is committed against civilians in the context of a conflict, 
committed in and around UN-managed refugee and internally displaced persons camps, or 
committed during disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.29 This paper 
uses the term ‘gender-based violence’ to capture ill-treatment influenced by the social 
construction of maleness and femaleness in a given society or culture. That ill-treatment may 
or may not have a sexual component.  
This study also uses the term ‘conflict’. Under IHL, there are two types of armed conflict. 
International armed conflict is conflict occurring between two or more States, in which one 
or more States have recourse to armed force against another State, “regardless of the reasons 
or the intensity of this confrontation”.30 ‘Non-international armed conflict’ – also known as 
‘internal armed conflict’ – refers to armed conflicts not of an international character 
occurring within the territory of a State.31 More clearly, the term refers to: 
protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed 
forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such 
groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva 
Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of 
intensity and the parties involved must show a minimum [degree] of 
organization.32 
While this study uses the term ‘conflict’ to capture the violence within both international and 
non-international armed conflicts, it also uses the term to capture situations near, but not 
necessarily at, the threshold of non-international armed conflict as understood under IHL. In 
other words, the term ‘conflict’, as used in this study, is meant to go somewhat beyond the 
strict legal boundaries of IHL. This is done in order to reflect the reality of the lives of 
women and girls fleeing conflict: the types of persecution they face that may be considered 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/DPA%20Guidance%20for%20Mediators%2
0on%20Addressing%20Conflict-
Related%20Sexual%20Violence%20in%20Ceasefire%20and%20Peace%20Agreements.pdf, 5 [UN DPA, 
‘Guidance for Mediators’]. 
29 Ibid. 
30 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International 
Humanitarian Law? International Committee of the Red Cross Opinion Paper’, March 2008, available online 
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf, 1 [ICRC, ‘How is the Term’]. 
The definition of ‘international armed conflict’ also includes conflicts in which peoples are fighting against 
colonial domination, alien occupation or racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination: 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3 (8 June 1977), Art. 1(4). 
31 E.g., Geneva Convention of 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (entered 
into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (12 August 1949) (Fourth Geneva Convention), art. 3. 
32 ICRC, ‘How is the Term’, note 30 above, 5. 
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as conflict-related may begin before the legal threshold between internal disturbances and 
armed conflict is crossed and may continue through to post-conflict.33 In other words, in 
some cases, it may not be useful to make bright line distinctions when it is unclear whether 
the conflict being considered is just under or at the IHL threshold and that threshold is not 
important for describing the ill-treatment suffered. On the other hand, there may indeed be 
cases where it is useful to invoke the IHL threshold: for example, where the classification of 
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and 
other forms of sexual violence as war crimes 34  would assist in their identification as 
persecution.35  
II  CHARACTER AND EFFECTS OF CONFLICT ON WOMEN 
AND GIRLS 
Conflict has wide-ranging physical, psychological, social and economic impacts on the lives 
of women and girls.36 This Part outlines some of these effects as an overview of the types of 
experiences that might form the basis of a refugee claim. However, it is important to note at 
the outset that the experiences of individual women and girls in conflict vary and are 
influenced by a range of factors, such as age, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, disability, 
sexuality and gender identity. These factors may make individual women and girls more or 
less vulnerable in a particular conflict.37 It is also important to understand that the impact of 
a conflict is interlinked with the status of women and girls in a given society prior to the 
conflict: “the additional layer of preexisting exclusions and discrimination that typify 
women’s status in many societies has an additional and compounding effect on the waging 
of and experiences that follow from war in conflicted societies”.38 This is because armed 
conflict tends to exacerbate gender inequality.39 For example, women and girls face violence 
                                                 
33 F. Ní Aolaín, D.F. Haynes and N. Cahn, On the Frontlines: Gender, War, and the Post-Conflict Process (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 28 [Ní Aolaín et al.], 46. 
34 This list comes from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (entered into force 1 July 2002) 
2187 UNTS 90 (Rome Statute), arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e) (vi) [Rome Statute]. 
35 The same observations were noted at UNHCR and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Expert 
Meeting on Complementarities between International Refugee Law, International Criminal Law and International 
Human Rights Law: Summary Conclusions, July 2011, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e1729d52.html. 
36  M. Eriksson, Defining Rape: Emerging Obligations for States under International Law? (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 125. See also UNSC Res. 1820 (2008), 19 June 2008 [Resolution 1820] preambular 
para. 6.  
37 Gardam and Jarvis, note 27 above, 19. 
38 Ní Aolaín et al., note 33 above, 28. 
39 Gardam and Jarvis, note 27 above, 21. 
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(such as domestic violence) during peacetime in every country in the world, 40  but the 
presence of an armed conflict tends to escalate the types and levels of physical and 
psychological violence they face because of the breakdown of law and order, increase in 
availability of small arms and light weapons, and loss of family and community protection.41 
It also tends to have a severely negative impact on their economic and social well-being – for 
example, interrupted access to survival goods makes it difficult for women to care for 
themselves and their families.42 
Even though individual women and girls may experience conflict differently because of 
different intersectionalities, it is possible to identify a range of ways in which there may be a 
‘female’ experience of conflict. This experience may be entirely different from that of men 
and boys, or it may overlap with that of men and boys but be expressed in a gendered way. 
For example, both males and females are at risk of dying in an armed conflict, but women 
and girls may be directly targeted for death, death threats or torture for challenging the 
socially-constructed gender norms of a society,43 or as a result of the political or military 
activities of their male relatives or friends.44 Or, women and girls may be caught in the 
crossfire or seen as dispensable ‘cannon fodder’ by forces on all sides.45 They may be used as 
civilian human shields to try to deter the other side from attacking a military installation.46 
The traditional role of women and girls as caregivers for the family (including the elderly, 
sick and the young) may make it more difficult to escape dangerous circumstances and 
sometimes results in death from being caught in the midst of a battle between opposing 
forces or fleeing into areas with landmines.47  
Women and girls also may witness death in a gender-related manner. The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone recorded many stories of women and girls forced to watch their loved ones—
often male relatives such as husbands—be killed by the rebels, as a form of severe 
                                                 
40 B. Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence and International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 1. 
41 Gardam and Jarvis, note 27 above, 25.  
42 Ibid.  
43 International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘Across the Lines: the Impact of Nepal’s Conflict on Women’, 
December 2010, available online at http://www.ictj.org/publication/across-lines-impact-nepals-conflict-
women , 46-47 [ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’]. 
44 In Nepal, wives of government officials or security personnel were subjected to rape and torture: ibid., 47. 
See also: Amnesty International, ‘This is What We Demand. Justice! Impunity for Sexual Violence Against 
Women in Colombia’s Armed Conflict’, September 2011, available online at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/018/2011/en , 32 [Amnesty International, ‘Colombia’]. 
45 Gardam and Jarvis, note 28 above, 22. 
46 Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights Watch Testimony to International Tribunal on Crimes Against 
Women in Burma’, 27 June 2010, available online at http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/27/human-rights-
watch-testimony-women-s-tribunal. 
47 Gardam and Jarvis, note 28 above, 22 and 24. 
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psychological torture.48 This was a way for the rebels to terrorize the civilian population into 
submission.49 As well, many women and girls suffer the death or disappearance of male 
family members during conflict,50 causing “immeasurable emotional, social and economic 
suffering for the women who are left to reconstruct their lives following the conflict.”51  
Women and girls are also vulnerable to physical and psychological violations during 
conflict. The most well-known form of violence directed against women and girls because of 
their gender is sexual violence, which can take many forms. Rape is perhaps the most 
notorious, and it comes in many permutations: women and girls may be raped by one 
person in private (for example, when a soldier searches a house),52 raped in public, raped by 
multiple people, or forced to participate in sexual intercourse or other sexual acts with 
family members or fellow civilians.53 The reduced presence of men in households during 
times of conflict means that security forces and private individuals may opportunistically 
target women and girls for rape.54 Other forms of sexual violence include sexual slavery,55 
forced prostitution, sexual mutilation, sexual humiliation,56 unwanted sexual touching57 and 
being compelled to exchange sex for essential items or any other reason.58  
                                                 
48 Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Trial Judgment, 9 March 2009, paras 1194, 1347 [Sesay 
Trial Judgment]. 
49 Ibid., paras 1352, 1356. 
50 For example, during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, women, children and the elderly in Srebrenica 
were separated from male family members above the age of approximately 16. Thousands of these men and 
boys were then killed: Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001, paras 633-
636, 644-645; Prosecutor v. Popović et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, 10 June 2010, paras 837, 841, 856-863. 
51 Gardam and Jarvis, note 27 above, 37 and 39, footnotes omitted; ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 28; 
Human Rights Watch, ‘At a Crossroads: Human Rights in Iraq Eight Years After the US-Led Invasion’, 21 
February 2011, available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/02/21/crossroads, 22-23 [HRW, ‘At a 
Crossroads’].  
52 The Trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ‘Witness: Bemba’s Soldiers Raped Me, Stole Our Goats, Shot Our 
Dog’, 20 November 2010, available online at http://www.bembatrial.org/2010/11/witness-
bemba%E2%80%99s-soldiers-raped-me-stole-our-goats-shot-our-dog/. 
53 Sesay Trial Judgment, note 48 above, para. 1347. 
54 ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 46. 
55 During WWII, more than 200,000 girls and women were enslaved in so-called ‘comfort stations’ associated 
with the Japanese Imperial Army throughout Asia: UN Economic and Social Council, Commission on 
Human Rights, ‘Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices 
During Armed Conflict: Update to the Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special 
Rapporteur,’ 6 June 2000, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21, para. 71; UN Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights, ‘Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and 
Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict: Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special 
Rapporteur’, 22 June 1998, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13, app. para. 1. 
56 Gardam and Jarvis, note 27 above, 25, citing to M. Goldenberg, ‘Memoires of Auschwitz Survivors’ in D. 
Ofer and L. Weitzman, eds, Women and the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 330-331, 
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During conflict, no place is entirely safe for women and girls. Families may flee to protect the 
females in the family from rape, or girls may be married off by their families at a young age 
in an attempt to protect them from conflict-related sexual violence. 59  However, these 
attempts at protection do not always succeed because conflict-related sexual violence can 
occur in many places: at roadblocks,60 in one’s own house,61 in fields,62 in places of refuge,63 
in detention centres,64 in army barracks,65 in public or communal areas,66 in refugee camps,67 
and in places where women and girls are hiding.68 
The perpetrators of sexual violence are also varied. They may be soldiers from the other 
“side” of the conflict,69 “friendly” forces,70 mercenaries, State officials, civilians in situations 
of control (such as guards at detention facilities),71 opportunistic civilians (both known and 
unknown to the victim) or peacekeepers.72  
                                                                                                                                                 
recounting how women were forced to strip naked and lie on tables while SS officers jeered and poked the 
women’s genital with a stick. 
57 For example, in Nepal, young girls reported that security forces did “security checks” on the way to 
school, which involved touching their breasts and hips and being subjected to verbal abuse: ICTJ, ‘Across 
the Lines’, note 43 above, 51. 
58 Gardam and Jarvis, note 27 above, 26. 
59 UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged 
violations of international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’, 1 June 2011, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/17/44, para. 214. 
60 Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, Judgment and Sentence, 24 June 2011, paras 
3132-3135, 6076-6088 and 6094. 
61 For examples in Nepal, see ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 50. 
62 Human Rights Watch, ‘Afraid and Forgotten, Lawlessness, Rape and Impunity in Western Côte d’Ivoire’, 
22 October 2010, available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/10/22/afraid-and-forgotten-0, 31 
[HRW, ‘Afraid and Forgotten’]. 
63 R c. Munyaneza, 2009 QCCS 2201, at paras. 724-739, 2082-2089 (Canada) [Munyaneza].  
64 Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Witness to War Crimes: Evidence from Misrata, Libya’, August 2011, 
available online at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/witness-to-war-crimes.html, 4 and 15 
[PHR, ‘Witness to War Crimes’]. 
65 ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 52-3.  
66 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 2 September 1998, at paras. 416, 421-422, 429, 
437, 449-452 [Akayesu Trial Judgment]. 
67 Human Rights Watch, ‘“Welcome to Kenya”– Police Abuses of Somali Refugees’, 17 June 2010, available 
online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/06/17/welcome-kenya-0, 6-8 [HRW, ‘Welcome to Kenya’].  
68 Human Rights Watch, ‘“We’ll Kill You if You Cry”: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict’, 17 
January 2003, available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/01/16/well-kill-you-if-you-cry, 31.  
69 Amnesty International, ‘Mali: Five Months of Crisis, Armed Rebellion and Military Coup’ 16 May 2012, 
available online at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR37/001/2012/en , 5. 
70 ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 55. 
71 Prosecutor v. Nicolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, 18 December 2003, at paras. 21-22.  
72 Advisor on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Peacekeeping Personnel, ‘A comprehensive strategy to 
eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations’, 24 March 2005, 
UN Doc. A/59/710.  
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Women and girls may face heightened vulnerability to sexual violence because of the 
intersection of their sex or gender and other identities. One example can be seen in the 1994 
Rwandan genocide: during the genocide, Tutsi women were portrayed in the media as 
“seductress spies” who needed to be punished through rape.73 Another example relates to 
age—the rape of very young girls has been reported in many conflicts, with far-reaching 
physical and psychological injuries.74 Being an older women does not protect individuals 
from being raped: for example, Human Rights Watch reported a 78 year old rape victim in 
Western Côte d’Ivoire.75 And, in some places, the very fact of being female—regardless of 
any other identity—makes one extremely vulnerable. In the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, there are no variables (whether education, level of wealth, or area of residence 
(urban vs. rural)) that provide protection from sexual violence.76  
Turning now to the wider category of gender-based violence, women and girls may also face 
violence based upon socially-constructed norms of maleness and femaleness. This violence 
may or may not have a sexual aspect. For example, since women and girls are often seen as 
responsible for the home, they may be enslaved to carry out domestic forced labour such as 
cooking,77 cleaning, and laundering.78 They may also be forced to porter for opposing or 
friendly forces.79 During the conflict in Sierra Leone, girls and women were abducted or 
captured and then individually assigned as a ‘bush wife’ to a rebel soldier or commander. 
These ‘wives’ were expected to provide sex on demand and to cook, clean and provide other 
domestic services: this has been termed ‘forced marriage’ or conjugal slavery.80 In a different 
                                                 
73 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence, 3 December 2003, paras 177, 
963, 1079.  
74 ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 55 (rape of a 5 year old). The United Nations Population Fund, in 
reporting on 15,996 new cases of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2008, indicated 
that 65% of the victims were under the age of 18, with 10% under the age of 10: Figures on Sexual Violence 
Reported in the DRC in 2008 (New York: UN Population Fund, 2009), 1, as cited in Human Rights Watch , 
‘Soldiers Who Rape, Commanders Who Condone’, 16 July 2009, available online at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/84366/section/7, 1. Human Rights Watch reported rape of infants in Western 
Côte d’Ivoire: HRW, ‘Afraid and Forgotten’, note 62 above, 32 and 38. See also Amnesty International, 
‘Colombia’, note 44 above, 17. 
75 HRW, ‘Afraid and Forgotten’, note 62 above, 38.  
76 A. Peterman, T. Palermo and C. Bredenkamp, ‘Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against 
Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, (2011) 101:6 American Journal of Public Health 1060. 
77 PHR, ‘Witness to War Crimes’, note 64 above, 15. 
78 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, 22 February 2001, paras. 63, 
68, 182, 188, 210, 574, 751. 
79 Human Rights Watch, ‘“Untold Miseries” - Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin 
State’, 20 March 2012, available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/03/20/untold-miseries, 36-50. 
80 Sesay Trial Judgment, note 48 above, paras. 1154-1155, 1211, 1213, 1293, 1295, 1412-1413 and 1466-1472; 
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Judgment, 18 May 2012, paras. 424-430 [Taylor Trial 
Judgment]. 
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permutation, teenage girls in Nepal were enticed into marriage by security forces personnel 
stationed in villages and then were subsequently abandoned when the army unit moved 
on.81 These ‘conflict wives’ and their children have been severely stigmatized.82 Additional 
forms of gender-based violence include forced pregnancy, forced sterilization and forced 
abortion.  
Many seemingly gender-neutral forms of violence are actually gendered in the way they are 
carried out, or in their effects. For example, torture of women and girls in detention is often 
carried out in an intensely gendered manner.83 Similarly, the war crime of committing acts of 
terror may be carried out through various forms of rape, forced marriage/conjugal slavery 
and other gender-based prohibited acts. 84  Forced displacement also has gender-specific 
effects: for example, the position of women and girls in society, their care responsibilities, or 
their frequent lack of means to travel, means that they may not be able to escape the violence 
as readily as more mobile citizens.85 Once they do flee, they tend to suffer immense hardship 
as they make their way to a refuge—they may be physically and sexually attacked, robbed or 
extorted along the way,86 and they often must search for basic necessities of life while caring 
for family members.87 Their journey to safety may also be fraught with other gender-related 
forms of harm, including paying for safe passage with sexual favours. 
“The massive upheavals and social dislocation caused by conflict also have particular 
impacts on women, who bear the disproportionate burden of social and economic rights 
                                                 
81 Institute of Human Rights Communication Nepal, ‘Sexual Violence in the “People’s War”: The Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Women and Girls in Nepal,’ 2006, cited in ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 32 n. 
39.  
82 ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, supra note 43 at 32. 
83 Torture through rape was mentioned above; other forms include: inserting foreign objects such as guns, 
sticks or knives, into the vagina; walking on a women’s body with heavy boots; punching and kicking 
sensitive areas such as breasts and genitals; applying electric shocks to breasts and genitals; forced nudity; 
and threats of sexual abuse: ibid. 
84 Sesay Trial Judgment, note 48 above, paras. 131347-1356; Taylor Trial Judgment, note 80 above, paras. 2034-
2037, 2051-2052, 2175 and 2177. 
85 UNHCR, Handbook on the Protection of Women and Girls, March 2008, available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/47cfae612.html, 8 .  
86 HRW, ‘Welcome to Kenya’, note 67 above, 22. 
87 Human Rights Watch, ‘Sexual Violence and its Consequences among Displaced Persons in Darfur and 
Chad’, 12 April 2005, available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/04/12/sexual-violence-and-its-
consequences-among-displaced-persons-darfur-and-chad, 6; International Committee of the Red Cross, 
‘Women Facing War’, 31 December 2001, available online at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0798.htm, 65 [ICRC, ‘Women Facing War’], 65-
66. 
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violations.” 88  Conflict disrupts local economies, often preventing small female-run 
businesses from operating.89 Conflict also disrupts the ability of women and girls to provide 
food and other necessities for their families: this may be a deliberate tactic to cause 
starvation or other deprivation, or it may be a by-product of fighting.90 Conflict also presents 
opportunities for extortion and criminal activities, causing even more financial difficulties in 
female-headed households who are desperate to find means to support their families.91 As a 
result of conflict-created poverty, women and girls may be forced to sell their most valuable 
possessions or may undertake illegal activities or prostitution to gain access to survival 
goods.92 In polygamous societies, the economic hardships of conflict may force women into 
becoming a third or fourth wife.93  
Forced evictions during conflict or generalized violence can have a serious impact upon 
women and girls.94 Often, the home represents the centre of life for family, and care for the 
individuals within the home is often the responsibility of women and girls.95 Loss of this 
centre of existence represents a loss of security and independence, as well as of possessions.96  
Education is also affected by conflict, and has a specific impact on girls. For example, in 
Somalia, girls at school, or en route between home and school, are targeted for rape and 
forced marriage, which has resulted in girls leaving school—usually more quickly and at a 
much higher rate than boys.97 Sometimes girls are withdrawn from school to provide help at 
                                                 
88  UN Women, ‘2011-2012 Progress of the World’s Women: In Pursuit of Justice’, available online at 
http://progress.unwomen.org/pdfs/EN-Report-Progress.pdf, 84. 
89 ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 43.  
90 ICRC, ‘Women Facing War’, note 87 above, 76-77, and Gardam and Jarvis, note 27 above, 40. 
91 HRW, ‘At a Crossroads’, note 51 above, 22-25. 
92 European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, ‘Study on Criminal Accountability in Sri Lanka as 
of January 2009’, June 2010, available online at http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/ecchr-
publications.html?file=tl_files/Dokumente/Publikationen/ECCHR_Sri%20Lanka%20Study.pdf, 23; UNICEF, 
‘The Impact of Conflict on Women and Girls in West and Central Africa and the UNICEF Response’, 
February 2005, available online at http://www.unicef.org/publications/index_25262.html, 21. 
93  M. Turshen, ‘Women’s War Stories’, in M. Turshen and C. Twagiramariya, eds, What Women do in 
Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa (New York: Zed Books, 1998), 16. 
94 L. Farha, ‘The Case of Forced Evictions’, in I. L. Sajor, ed., ‘Our Common Grounds’, in Common Grounds, 
Violence Against Women in War and Armed Conflict Situations (Quezon City, Philippines: Asian Centre for 
Women’s Human Rights, 1998), 77. 
95 Graça Machel, ‘Impact of Armed Conflict on Children’, 26 August 1996, UN Doc. A/51/306, cited in 
Gardam and Jarvis, note 27 above, 31. 
96  B. Goldblatt and S. Meintjes, ‘South African Women Demand the Truth’ in M. Turshen and C. 
Twagiramariya, eds., What Women do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa (New York: Zed Books, 1998), 
47. 
97 Human Rights Watch, ‘No Place for Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage and Attacks on Schools 
in Somalia’, 10 February 2012, available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/02/20/no-place-children, 
62-63 [HRW, ‘No Place for Children’].  
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home, especially in the absence of menfolk or when their mothers are forced to leave home 
to find work. 98  Other times girls are excluded from schools, most notably in Taliban-
controlled areas of Afghanistan.99 Within schools, warring parties may deliberately attack 
female students and teachers.100  
Women and girls are often actors in conflict, and are not only bystanders.101 They may be 
involved in activating, maintaining and perpetuating conflict. 102  They may be fighters, 
political leaders or organizers, informants, lookouts or medical caregivers and/or they may 
protect others doing these tasks. 103  They may also be involved in resolving conflict. 
Sometimes, these choices are relatively freely taken, but sometimes these choices are taken in 
severely constraining circumstances, such as poverty and extreme physical and 
psychological insecurity.104 Sometimes, there is no choice: for example, many girls have been 
abducted and forced to serve as child soldiers.105 All of these roles can put women and girls 
at risk for persecution both during the conflict and in the post-conflict period.106  
The impact of conflict does not necessarily end when the conflict is considered over by the 
international community: “consistently across all conflicts, sexual and gender-based violence 
rarely conforms to the timelines of peace treaties and ceasefires but endures past them.”107 
                                                 
98 Women’s Refugee Commission, ‘Refugee Girls: The Invisible Faces of War’, May 2009, available online at 
http://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/programs/youth/763-girlsstories , 16-17.  
99  Oxfam, ‘High Stakes: Girls’ Education in Afghanistan’, 24 February 2011, available online at 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/high-stakes-girls-education-afghanistan, 15.  
100 UNICEF, ‘Machel Study 10-Year Strategic Review: Children and Conflict in a Changing World’, April 
2009, available online at http://www.un.org/children/conflict/english/machel10.html, 22. 
101 E.g., in Nepal, women were a prominent and dynamic presence within the ranks of the Maoist movement 
and insurgency, and in this way were active within the conflict: ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 26. 
102 Ní Aolaín et al., On the Frontlines, note 33 above, 42 and United Nations Secretary-General, Women, Peace 
and Security: Study Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) (New 
York: United Nations, 2002), para. 48 [United Nations Secretary-General, Women, Peace and Security]. 
103 ICRC, ‘Women Facing War’, note 87 above, 23; Ní Aolaín et al., On the Frontlines, note 33 above, 43; 
United Nations Secretary-General, Women, Peace and Security, note 102 above, paras. 47-48.  
104 E.g., girls in Sri Lanka who were poor, lived in a conflict zone, and were separated from their family were 
more likely to join an armed group: Y. E. Keairns, The Voices of Girl Soldiers: Sri Lanka (New York: Quaker 
United Nations Office, 2003), 16. Other risk factors that were important in their becoming child soldiers 
were: dropping out of school; not having a voice in decisions that affect their life; being marginalized in new 
family structures; and the failure to be protected by the family: ibid.   
105 UN Division for the Advancement of Women and UNICEF Expert Group, ‘The Girl Child and Armed 
Conflict: Recognizing and addressing grave violations of girls’ human rights’, 28 September 2006, UN Doc. 
EGM/DVGC/2006/EP.12, 4-6 and 9-10. 
106 E.g., see: ‘Timor-Leste: Women are also resistance heroes’, IRIN Humanitarian News and Analysis, 5 June 
2012, available online at http://www.irinnews.org/Report/95583/TIMOR-LESTE-Women-are-also-resistance-
heroes  
107 Ní Aolaín et al., On the Frontlines, note 33 above, 46. 
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Violence against women and girls tends to become ‘normalized’ during conflict and carries 
into the post-conflict period.108 As well, some women and girls continue to live in conflict-
created social circumstances: for example, many girls (now women) who were forced to 
become ‘bush wives’ during the Sierra Leone conflict stayed with their ‘husbands’ after the 
conflict, as social stigmatization, loss of family, poverty, and loss of education left them with 
no other alternatives.109  
This Part has outlined a number of ways in which conflict has profound and lasting effects 
on the lives of women and girls. The discussions in Parts 3 and 4 below will outline how 
some of these experiences have been recognized as creating a well-founded fear of 
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
or political opinion. However, the discussion in Part 3 will also illustrate that, many times, 
the refugee claims of women and girls fleeing conflict are dismissed as stemming from 
indiscriminate violence – violence that is assumed to affect everyone similarly in a given 
conflict area.  
III  PERSECUTION 
The Refugee Convention requires that the refugee claimant possess a well-founded fear of a 
form of harm that qualifies as persecution.110 The term ‘persecution’ is not defined in the 
Convention, though there is agreement that “a threat to life or freedom on account of race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group” and other 
serious violations of international human rights constitute persecution. 111  There are a 
number of gender-related forms of harm that are currently considered to fit within these 
parameters - such as rape, dowry-related violence, female genital mutilation, domestic 
violence, and trafficking - because they inflict severe pain and suffering (both mental and 
physical), whether perpetrated by State or non-State actors.112 However, only some gender-
                                                 
108 UN Women, note 88 above, 84. 
109 As such, sexual slavery is considered a continuing crime: Taylor Trial Judgment, note 80 above, paras. 119 
and 1018. 
110 Refugee Convention, note 4 above, Art. 1A(2). 
111  UNHCR, ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’, January 1992, HCR/1P/4/Eng/Rev.1, 
available online at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3ae6b3314.pdf, para. 51. Such human rights would 
include those listed in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
112 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution’, note 8 above, para. 
9.  
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related forms of ill-treatment common in the context of conflict have been recognized as 
rising to the level of persecution. 
This Part will begin by examining the conflict-related violation that is most well-established 
as a form of gendered persecution: rape. Despite the seeming solidity of this recognition, an 
examination of the case law demonstrates that there are still problem areas related to rape 
that have not yet been overcome in refugee jurisprudence. This Part then turns to examine 
case law on the recognition of other forms of conflict-related sexual, and non-sexual but still 
gendered, violence as persecution. This Part concludes by discussing how gender-related 
persecution is, or may be, overlooked when decision-makers consider conflict-related ill-
treatment to be indiscriminate in nature. 
1 Rape in Conflict 
Rape is committed for many reasons during conflict.113  These reasons may range from 
opportunistic “sexual looting”, to strategic design, to a combination of the two.114 These 
reasons may overlap and co-exist in a given conflict, and may also change over time. Rape 
can also be committed in many ways, such as brutal gang rapes, the insertion of various 
objects into victims’ genitalia, the raping of pregnant women and forced sexual intercourse 
between male and female civilian abductees, as had been carried out by the rebels during the 
conflict in Sierra Leone.115 Rape is an expression by the perpetrator of control and power,116 
and therefore is effective in not only physically and psychologically harming the victims, but 
also in tearing apart social units (such as families and communities).117 This is why rape has 
been acknowledged as a particularly effective tool of genocide, 118  as a crime against 
humanity (including the crime against humanity of persecution),119 and as a war crime.120 
Rape has also been recognized as a human rights violation.121 
                                                 
113  For a review of reasons or motives behind conflict-related sexual violence, see: OCHA Policy 
Development and Studies Branch, ‘Sexual Violence and Conflict: Understanding the Motivations’, 20 June 
2008, available online at http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docId=1092310. 
114 X. Agirre Aranburu, ‘Sexual Violence Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Using Pattern Evidence and Analysis 
for International Cases’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 609 at 613-614, 622. 
115 Sesay Trial Judgment, note 48 above, paras. 1181, 1185, 1193-1194, 12-5-1207 and 1289. 
116 Eriksson, note 36 above, 171. 
117 Ibid. 126; Sesay Trial Judgment, note 48 above, paras 1349-1350. 
118 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has observed: “Sexual violence was an integral part of 
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para. 731.  
119 E.g., Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 2 August 2001, paras. 617-618; and Prosecutor v. 
Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 September 2004, para. 1008. 
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Given the serious harm created by rape, it is therefore not surprising that rape has been 
identified within international and domestic refugee law as a form of persecution. UNHCR 
has stated that “[t]here is no doubt” that rape is an act which inflicts severe pain and 
suffering (both mental and physical) and which has been used as a form of persecution by 
States and non-State actors. 122  Various country guidelines, directed at refugee claim 
adjudicators, also specify rape as a form of persecution.123 Domestic refugee case law has also 
recognized rape in conflict as a form of persecution: “it is not disputed that rape amounts to 
persecution”.124 Within the case set, 20 cases involved claims of rape (of the claimant or a 
family member), or fear of rape, as persecution.125 Of these, eight claims or appeals were 
accepted on the evidence of past rape and/or future feared rape.126 For example, in a New 
Zealand case involving the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the female applicant’s 
husband was sexually assaulted in detention; her mother and sister were raped during a 
                                                                                                                                                 
120 Rape is explicitly listed as a crime against humanity, and sometimes also as a war crime, in international 
criminal statutes: e.g. Rome Statute, note 34 above, Arts. 7(g). 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi); Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (adopted 25 May 1993) 32 ILM 1192, Art. 5(g); 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (adopted 8 November 1994) 33 ILM 1602, Art. 
3(g); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (adopted 14 August 2000) 40 ILM 247, Art. 2(g); and Allied 
Control Council Law No 10, “Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
Against Humanity”, 20 December 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany, No. 3, Art. 2(a) at 
50-55 (entered into force 31 January 1946). 
121 UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, UNGA Res. 48/104, 20 December 1993, 
217, Art. 2. 
122 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution’, note 8 above, para. 
9. 
123 E.g., Canadian Guidelines, note 12 above, para. B; US Guidelines, note 17 above, 9; and UK Guidelines, 
note 16 above, 2A.18. 
124 SS (Burundi) CG [2004] UKIAT 00290 (29 October 2004) (UK), para. 16 [SS (UK)]. 
125 1203764 [2012] RRTA 312 (18 May 2012) (Australia) [1203764 (Australia)]; TA6-00022 [2007] RPDD No. 233 
(29 October 2007) (Canada) [TA6-00022 (Canada)]; JXV (Re) [2008] RPDD No. 3 (23 January 2008) (Canada) 
[JXV (Canada)]; VA8-01482 [2010] RPDD No. 105 (8 March 2010) (Canada) [VA8-01482 (Canada)]; VA9-00148 
[2010] RPDD No. 512 (30 June 2010) (Canada) [VA9-00148 (Canada)]; MA8-07482 [2010] RPDD No. 145 (17 
September 2010) (Canada) [MA8-07482 (Canada)]; Kika v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [2011] FC 
1039 (2 September 2011) (Canada) [Kika (Canada)]; Refugee Appeal Nos. 73894, 73895, 73896, 73897 (24 January 
2005) (New Zealand) [73894 et al. (New Zealand)]; Refugee Appeal No. 76464 & 76465 (28 June 2010) (New 
Zealand) [76464 & 76465 (New Zealand)]; AB [2011] NZIPT 800019 (24 August 2011) (New Zealand) [AB 
(New Zealand)]; SS (UK), note 124 above; NS Afghanistan CG [2004] UKIAT 00328 (30 December 2004) (UK) 
[NS (UK)]; In re B (FC) (Appellant) (2002) Regina v. Special Adjudicator (Respondent) ex parte Hoxha (FC) 
(Appellant) [2005] UKHL 19 (10 March 2005) (UK) [In re B (FC) (UK)]; BK DRC CG [2007] UKAIT 00098 
(September 2007) (UK) [BK (UK)]; LM Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) CG [2008] UKAIT 00064 (14 
August 2008) (UK) [LM Congo (UK)]; PS (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA 
Civ 1213 (23 October 2008) (UK) [PS (UK)]; AMM and others Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC) (15 July 
2011) (UK) [AMM and Others (UK)]; Mohammed v Attorney General [2005] 400 F.3d 785 (10 March 2005) (US) 
[Mohammed (US)]; Mambwe v Attorney General [2009] 572 F.3d 540 (16 July 2009) (US) [Mambwe (US)]; and 
Kante v Attorney General [2011] FED App. 0014N (6th Cir.) (7 January 2011) (US) [Kante (US)]. 
126 Kika (Canada), 73894 et al. (New Zealand); AB (New Zealand); NS (UK); In re B (FC) (UK); LM Congo 
(UK); PS (UK); and AMM and Others (UK); all note 125 above. 
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visit to their house by soldiers and other women in her house were sexually assaulted: this 
and other treatment during conflict was considered to amount to a well-founded fear of 
persecution.127  
However, it must be noted that several of the eight positive decisions presented troubling 
histories, only remedied on appeal. For example, in the Canadian case of Kika, the claimant 
had been raped by soldiers in the DRC in 2006.128 Her claim was initially denied on the basis 
of lack of evidence of persecution but was ordered to be reassessed, as “the officer 
apparently did not consider the possibility that Ms. Kika had a gender-based claim for 
refugee protection as a result of her sexual assault in 2006.”129 As in Kika, the claimant in the 
United Kingdom (UK) case of NS (Afghanistan) was originally denied asylum, in part 
because the adjudicator had found that her rape occurred “because the assailant found her 
attractive, and therefore that the attack was a purely personal one, and no more than a 
common crime”.130 On appeal, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal stated that this “finding 
was not based on the evidence before [the adjudicator]”. 131 The evidence was that the 
applicant’s husband had been detained by the militia of a warlord on suspicion of 
supporting the warlord’s enemy.132 The warlord’s nephew took advantage of her husband’s 
detention and the applicant’s vulnerability133 and demanded that the applicant become his 
fourth wife; when she refused, he raped, beat and threatened her with death.134 The Tribunal 
concluded that “to take as a wife, by force, the wife of one’s enemy, after first imprisoning 
him, is not an uncommon act in the course of war or other conflict, as an act of aggression 
against the enemy.”135 The applicant was granted refugee status.136 
In another UK case from the case set, PS (Sri Lanka), the applicant, a Tamil woman from 
Jaffna, had been raped on three occasions in her home by Sri Lankan soldiers.137 The first 
                                                 
127 73894 et al. (New Zealand), note 125 above, paras. 35, 43 and 97 [it was unclear whether the applicant 
herself had been raped]. 
128 Kika (Canada), note 125 above, para. 5. 
129 Ibid., para. 14. 
130 NS (UK), note 125 above, para. 16. Similarly, in Mambwe (US), the applicant was asked whether it was 
possible that the UNITA soldiers who had raped her were merely pursuing their own gratification. She 
agreed, but it is likely that she neither understood the implication of agreeing nor had considered the 
various possible motivations, note 125 above, 4. 
131 NS (UK), note 125 above, para. 16. 
132 Ibid., para. 28. 
133 Ibid., para. 29 (she was still being harassed by the militia, who killed her sister). 
134 Ibid., paras. 31 and 68. 
135 Ibid., para. 69. 
136 Ibid., para. 101. 
137 PS (UK), note 125 above, para. 1. 
  
23 
 
time, she was raped by two soldiers.138 Five days later, one of those soldiers returned, 
accompanied by a different soldier, and both of them raped her. A week or so after, these 
latter two soldiers returned, held her father at gunpoint so he would witness the act, and 
raped her again.139 She subsequently tried to kill herself and failed, and then discovered that 
she was pregnant.140 The immigration judge classified these soldiers as “rogue”, comparing 
them to three civilian criminals, and concluded that these past rapes had no relevance to the 
potential for future persecution.141 This decision was rejected on appeal: the soldiers were 
clearly able to act with impunity, given the repetition of the rapes, and therefore there was a 
real risk that she would again be targeted for rape by Sri Lankan soldiers in the vicinity.142 In 
a similar decision, the UK case of LM (Republic of Congo) accepted, on appeal, that the 
applicant had been raped in 1997 and that she had “a real risk of something similar 
happening to her on return”, although that latter contention had not been accepted earlier.143 
Finally, in In re B (FC), the House of Lords considered an appeal by a female Kosovar 
Albanian applicant who had been raped in front of her husband, sons and 20-30 neighbours 
due to suspected involvement in the Kosovo Liberation Army. Baroness Hale of Richmond 
found that the Court of Appeal had failed to realize that “the persecution of Mrs. B was 
expressed in a different way from the persecution of her husband and sons”, through rape, 
and that rape may be a weapon or strategy of war.144 
These examples demonstrate that rape claims stemming from conflict face some common 
obstacles. The first obstacle is in the characterization of the rape. Some adjudicators – such as 
the initial adjudicator in NS (Afghanistan) - view sexual violence in conflict as a matter of 
personal sexual gratification, rather than as a method of terrorizing, controlling or punishing 
civilians.145 In the UK case of Najjemba, the court held that a woman from Northern Uganda 
who had suffered rape at the hands of government soldiers was the victim of “simple and 
dreadful lust” and not persecution.146 This was despite her connection to her son, who was 
suspected of connection to a rebel group opposed to the Ugandan government, who had 
been ‘disappeared’.147  
                                                 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid., para. 7. 
142 Ibid., paras. 15 and 16. 
143 LM Congo (UK), note 125 above, paras. 1, 2 and 114.  
144 In re B (FC) (UK), note 125 above, para. 30.  
145 NS (UK), note 125 above, para. 16.  
146 Najjemba v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1082, para. 9 (15 July 2002) (UK). 
147 Ibid., para. 2. 
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A related concern is that those who commit sexual violence in conflict are sometimes viewed 
by adjudicators as having committed the act in their private capacity and are therefore 
analogous to common criminals rather than persecutors, which was the original reasoning in 
PS (Sri Lanka) and the reasoning in the Canadian case of VA9-00148.148 Both the ‘conflict rape 
as lust’ and the ‘conflict rape as a common crime’ approaches demonstrate a profound 
misunderstanding of the context of rape in conflict. As Macklin puts it: “some decision-
makers have proven unable to grasp the nature of rape by State actors [and non-State 
fighters, too] as an integral and tactical part of the arsenal of weapons deployed to brutalise, 
dehumanise, and humiliate women and demoralise their kin and community.” 149  The 
characterization of rape as lust incorrectly creates the impression that sexuality, rather than 
an exercise of power and gender-based discrimination, is at play. It also completely ignores 
the coercion, overarching violence and impunity created by the conflict. In other words, even 
if the perpetrator’s motive happens to be entirely sexual, it does not follow that the 
perpetrator did not target the victim for persecutory reasons or that his conduct does not 
cause severe pain and suffering.150 Similarly, the characterization of rape as a ‘common’ 
criminal activity instead of persecution assumes that the rape in conflict is somehow random 
or private – and therefore unconnected to the State and lacks the discriminatory or rights-
violating character required by the refugee definition.151 This is despite the fact that the rape 
occurs in the context of overarching violence and impunity enhanced by vulnerability and 
gender-based discrimination. [Note that the issue of rape as part of untargeted 
indiscriminate violence is discussed below.] Both types of (mis)characterizations of rape are 
not exclusive to refugee claims involving conflict,152 but the fact that they occur means that 
decision-makers are failing to adequately consider the environment surrounding the rape. 
                                                 
148 PS (UK), note 125 above, at para. 7; VA9-00148 (Canada), note 125 above, para. 16. More generally, see H. 
Crawley and T. Lester, ‘Comparative Analysis of Gender-Related Persecution in National Asylum 
Legislation and Practice in Europe’, May 2004, EPAU/2004/05, available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/40c071354.pdf, para. 167; and Crawley, Refugees and Gender, note 21 above, 89. See 
also N v. UK [2005] UKHL 31 (5 May 2005) (UK), para. 57 [N (UK)], relating that the adjudicator has found 
that the applicant’s rape by government soldiers as part of her interrogation for being part of the LRA was 
committed by “rogue elements in the security force”. 
149 A. Macklin, ‘Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly  213, 
226.  
150 Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-A, Appeals Judgment, 20 October 2010, Pocar J. partial 
dissent, para. 11. 
151 T. Spijkerboer, Gender and Refugee Status (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 94-95 and 97-98. The 
assumption that rape is ‘private’ can lead to three incorrect assumptions: first, a denial that the rape 
amounts to persecution; second, that it is not linked to the conflict; and third, that it has no state connection: 
Crawley, Refugees and Gender, note 21 above, 89.  
152 Crawley, Refugees and Gender, note 21 above, 44. 
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On a positive note, these characterizations were correctly dismissed in In re B (FC) and the 
UK case of N.153 
The second common obstacle identified in the case set is that, sometimes, adjudicators (and 
the applicant’s counsel) do not recognize the importance of considering the after-effects of 
past rape in order to consider the risk of future persecution.154 These after-effects commonly 
include societal stigma, which considers raped women and girls to be somehow ‘tainted’.155 
This stigma is a form of discrimination, and it can create social, cultural and economic 
exclusion for the victim and her children, and lead to increased vulnerability to sexual and 
other forms of violence, as well as death.156 For example, the U.S. case of Mambwe considered 
the claim of a young Angolan woman who had fled from UNITA forces as a child, was 
raped in a Zambian refugee camp (and gave birth as a result), and was kidnapped from 
Zambia by UNITA and repeatedly raped.157 Her appeal was denied on the basis that the 
conflict in Angola had ended.158 However, it appears that the Court (and earlier decision-
makers) did not consider the lasting stigma (and therefore discrimination) she would likely 
face in post-conflict Angola as a lone young women with no relatives, who had been a past 
victim of rape by rebels, raising a child conceived through rape.159 On the other hand, in In re 
B (FC), Baroness Hale of Richmond states: “To suffer the insult and indignity of being 
regarded by one’s own community (in Mrs. B’s words) as ‘dirty like contaminated’ because 
one has suffered the gross ill-treatment of a particularly brutal and dehumanizing rape 
directed against that very community is the sort of cumulative denial of human dignity 
                                                 
153 In re B (FC) (UK), note 125 above, para. 30; and N (UK), note 148 above, para. 58.  
154 E.g., even though NS (UK) contains strong gender analysis, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal did not 
consider the specific future risk of further victimization (including stigmatization) raised by the applicant’s 
previous rape. However, it did consider the risk to the applicant and her children of living in Kabul on her 
own without family or community support: NS (UK), note 125 above, paras. 64-65, 93-94 and 96. See also 
JXV (Canada), note 125 above, paras. 77 and 91: the applicant, who was from Bosnia-Herzegovina, claimed 
that she had been raped by Serb soldiers during the conflict and this would make her an outcast in her 
country of origin. The adjudicator did not consider this aspect and instead focused on another part of her 
claim (on religious persecution). 
155 E.g., in societies where virginity is highly valued, “loss of virginity for women often means loss of 
marriage opportunities, which can have severe social-cultural repercussions for them and their families.” 
ICTJ, ‘Across the Lines’, note 43 above, 27. 
156 Crawley, Refugees and Gender, note 21 above, 43. 
157 Mambwe (US), note 125 above, 2.  
158 Ibid., 7. 
159 Rape victims with children are often severely stigmatized and ostracized (as are their children): Turshen, 
note 93 above, 16. See also ICTJ, Across the Lines, note 43 above, 34. In some societies, the stigma seriously 
affects the child, as well: for example, In Nepal, children born of rape are not permitted to be registered, and 
therefore these children may not be able to obtain a citizenship card—this represents a sort of ‘civil death’ 
for the child: ibid., 34. 
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which to my mind is quite capable of amounting to persecution” as “the victim is punished 
again and again for something which was not only not her fault but was deliberately 
persecutory of her, her family and her community.” 160 She did note, however, that these 
“issues were not fully explored at an earlier stage in the proceedings”161 – these issues should 
have been identified by earlier decision-makers, but were overlooked. An evaluation of the 
risk created by the after-effects of rape should be a standard consideration in conflict-related 
cases, in order to better understand potential sources of future persecution. 
Other common obstacles to conflict-related refugee claims based on rape – such as rape 
being considered to be part of indiscriminate conflict, rape being found not to relate to a 
Convention ground, rape evidence being considered as not credible, and a lack of relevant 
country of origin information on rape in conflict – will be dealt with in the sections below.  
2 OTHER FORMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT 
While case law and academic analysis to date has largely focused on rape as a form of 
persecution common in conflict, other conflict-related sexual violence can also amount to 
persecution. International, regional and domestic refugee law have provided that other 
forms of sexual violence (whether committed in conflict or in peacetime), apart from rape, 
may qualify as forms of persecution.162 International criminal law provides some assistance 
in enumerating examples of such sexual violence: sexual slavery (including sexual slavery 
resulting from trafficking), enforced prostitution, mutilation of sexual organs or breasts and 
forced nudity have all been recognized as forms of sexual violence amounting to crimes 
against humanity and/or war crimes.163 There is also international guidance and domestic 
                                                 
160 In re B (FC) (UK), note 125 above, para. 36. 
161 Ibid., para. 39. 
162  E.g., trafficking for sexual slavery or enforced prostitution: UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International 
Protection: The Application of Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol related to the 
Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons at Risk of Being Trafficked’, 7 April 2006, 
HCR/GIP/06/07, available online at http://www.unhcr.org/443b626b2.html, para. 15 [UNHCR, ‘Trafficking 
Guidelines’]; Council Directive (EC) No. 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on the minimum standards for 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted [2004] OJ L304, Art. 9.2(a) 
includes acts of sexual violence; and UK Guidelines, note 16 above, para. 2A.18, which lists, apart from rape, 
“enforced nakedness, mechanical or manual stimulation of the erogenous zones; the insertion of objects into 
the body openings; the forced witnessing or commission of sexual acts; forced masturbation; fellatio and 
oral coitus; a general atmosphere of sexual aggression, the loss of the ability to reproduce plus threats of the 
above.” 
163 E.g., Rome Statute, note 34 above, Arts. 7(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi); Sesay Trial Judgment, note 48 
above, paras. 677-687, 1205 and 1208; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 7 May 
1997, paras 45, 198, 206; Akayesu Trial Judgment, note 66 above, para. 697; Munyaneza, note 63 above, para. 
96. 
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case law relating to trafficking for the purposes of sexual slavery or enforced prostitution.164 
Given their comparability to rape, it can be expected that the same obstacles outlined above 
would apply to other forms of sexual violence.165 
3 Other Forms of Gender-Related Ill-Treatment in Conflict 
There are a number of gender-related forms of ill-treatment that occur in conflict that may 
qualify as persecution. These include conjugal slavery (also referred to as ‘forced marriage’ 
in conflict),166 forced pregnancy,167 forced sterilization168 and forced abortion/miscarriage.169 
The latter three violations are likely the easiest to understand as gender-related crimes, since 
they are targeted at female reproductive organs. Conjugal slavery, which is comprised of 
sexual slavery plus domestic slavery, is also clearly a gender-related crime: the perpetrators 
enforce a norm of ‘femaleness’ on the victims, expecting them to submit to sex, cook and 
clean on demand. 
Other forms of gender-related persecution in conflict may be more difficult to identify, for 
two reasons: first, the persecutory acts may look gender-neutral on their face even though 
they are in fact gendered and, second, women and girls may experience, and therefore 
identify, harms differently than do men and boys. Both reasons require all those working 
with refugee claimants to listen closely to the stories told, to consider whether what is said 
reveals potential gendered ill-treatment, and to ask appropriate questions to gain further 
insight.170 Applicants may describe seemingly gender-neutral forms of ill-treatment, such as 
torture, enslavement, starvation and imprisonment, but underneath those descriptions may 
lie a gendered form of the harm: torture through threatened or actual sexual touching or 
                                                 
164 UNHCR, ‘Trafficking Guidelines’, note 162 above, para. 15; see also AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC) (UK). This author has not located a 
conflict-specific trafficking asylum claim. 
165 On the stigmatization of trafficking victims, see UNHCR, ‘Trafficking Guidelines’, note 162 above, para. 
18. 
166 Taylor Trial Judgment, note 80 above, paras. 427-428; and Sesay Trial Judgment, note 48 above, paras. See 
also see:  NS (UK), note 125 above, para. 69. 
167 Rome Statute, note 34 above, Arts. 7(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi). 
168 Ibid. 
169  M. Deen, ‘Pregnant Girls Forced to Abort’, The Lubanga Trial, 18 March 2009, available online at 
http://www.lubangatrial.org [Dean, Pregnant Girls’]. The case of NS (UK), note 125 above, contained facts 
linked to attempted forced marriage: para. 31, and the case of Mambwe, note 125 above, contained facts 
related to pregnancy resulting from rape: 2. 
170 This has been referred to as ‘hearing the right gaps’ in order to pursue those gaps: H. Baillot, S. Cowan 
and V. Munro, ‘‘Hearing the Right Gaps’: Enabling and Responding to Disclosures of Sexual Violence 
within the UK Asylum Process’ (2012) Social and Legal Studies 1-28 [Baillot et al., ‘Gaps’]. Proper listening 
requires training: UNHCR, ‘Improving Asylum Procedures – Gender’, note 19 above, 10.  
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rape,171 enslavement by forced domestic labour,172 starvation through intentional restriction 
of women’s movements such that they cannot tend to their fields/gardens or attend market 
(if those are traditionally ‘female’ roles in a given society), and imprisonment in apartments 
by the opposing side in a conflict, so as to create easily available female ‘entertainment’ for 
troops.173 Another example is terrorizing civilians: this may be achieved through a variety of 
methods, including rape, sexual slavery and conjugal slavery.174 In other words, while some 
ill-treatment will be gender-related on its face (like rape), other ill-treatment may only be 
revealed as such after gathering further information from the applicant. In the case set, there 
appeared to be missed chances to discover potential gendered ill-treatment, when ill-
treatment was simply described as ‘torture’ or ‘beatings’ without further explanation of how 
the torture or beatings were carried out.175 
The way in which women view harm may be gender-differentiated: “preliminary empirical 
research suggests that loss of a child, separation from children, and witnessing harm to 
children or family members are particularly viewed by women as primary harms to the self, 
often as or more egregious than a severe violation of their own bodies.”176 In addition, they 
may not be able to easily compartmentalize the harms they face into conflict- and non-
conflict-related for the purposes of describing persecution, because of the way in which 
gender-related physical harms are interrelated with social and economic harms. 177  For 
example, physical harms to the body are more easily understood as persecutory, but the 
insecurity or ill health caused by rape may be interlinked with the inability to collect wood 
for stoves or to plant crops, and both of the latter are also perceived by the victim as part of 
the persecution. 178  In this way, both the physical harms and the economic harms are 
gendered. On a related note, it is important to realize that sexual violence is very rarely the 
sole or central part of a woman or girl’s claim.179 Thus, applicants should be given the 
opportunity to identify the full range of conflict-related harms from her perspective, in order 
                                                 
171 Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, 10 December 1998, para. 163. 
172 Taylor Trial Judgment, note 81 above, paras. 1066, 1072-1075, 1094, 1098, 1108, 1144-1146, 1828 and 1833.  
173 Kunarac Trial Judgment, note 79 above, paras. 767-769, 772.  
174 Sesay Trial Judgment, note 48 above, paras.1347-1351; and Taylor Trial Judgment, note 80 above, paras. 
2034, 2036, 2037, 2051-2052, 2175 and 2177. 
175 See 73894 et al. (New Zealand), note 125 above, para. 41; and EB (Ethiopia) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2007] EWCA Civ 809 (31 July 2007) (UK) 1 [EB (UK)]. 
176 Ní Aolaín et al., On the Frontlines, note 33 above, 48 and 154. This is illustrated in the observation that 
“[f]emale claimants may also fail to relate questions about “torture” to the types of harm which they fear”: 
UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 1 – Gender-Related Persecution’, note 8 above, para. 
36(vii). 
177 Ní Aolaín et al., On the Frontlines, note 33 above, 46.  
178 Example taken from ibid., 45. 
179 Baillot et al, ‘Gaps’, note 170 above, 21. 
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for the harms to be evaluated cumulatively as persecution. In the case set, adjudicators 
tended to focus on the most obvious individual gender-related violation when considering 
whether persecution is gender-related, 180  rather than evaluating the harms as a whole, 
although there were exceptions.181 As well, sometimes gender aspects were simply never 
raised or examined by the applicant (or her representative) or the decision-makers, or the 
adjudicator decided to focus on the non-gender-related aspects of the claim. 182 This has been 
identified as a particular problem in cases involving sexual violence – “a tendency among 
some asylum professionals to marginalize, trivialize or ignore accounts of rape.”183  
4  INDISCRIMINATE VERSUS TARGETED GENDER-RELATED ILL-TREATMENT 
This Part concludes by discussing a common way in which gender-related persecution is, or 
may be, overlooked when addressing claims of women and girls fleeing conflict situations: 
gender-related violence may be classified as part of the general indiscriminate consequences 
of conflict and not targeted at the claimant. This classification occurred in a significant 
number of the cases in the case set - this is obviously a major obstacle for female refugee 
claimants fleeing conflict.184 For example, in the Canadian case of VA9-00148, an applicant 
from the DRC described an attack in 2008, in which rebels came to her home, demanding 
money, since they knew that her family had a business.185 Her family was beaten and 
                                                 
180 E.g., SS (UK), note 124 above; HH & Others Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00022 (November 2007) (UK) [HH 
(UK)]; LM Congo (UK), note 125 above; Mohammed (US), note 125 above; and Mambwe (US), note 125 above. 
181 E.g. NS (UK), note 125 above, paras. 60-64; and NA Iraq CG [2008] UKAIT 00046 (2 January 2008) (UK), 
paras. 91-98 [NA (UK)]. 
182 E.g. In re B (FC) (UK), note 125 above, paras. 30-39; N (UK), note 148 above, para. 58; JXV (Canada), note 
125 above, para. 91; 0901064 [2009] RRTA 373 (4 May 2009) (Australia) [0901064 (Australia)] (unclear 
whether her torture was gendered despite country of origin information on gendered abuse in detention (at 
para. 54), and whether she was chosen to deliver the parcels because of gendered assumption that a woman 
would attract less attention or would be less at risk; 1010754 [2011] RRTA 320 (4 May 2011) (Australia) (the 
gendered aspects of the applicant’s status as a widow and of the harassment (para. 30) were not explored) 
[1010754 (Australia)]; and EB (UK), note 175 above (the potentially gendered aspects of torture were not 
explored); AB [2011] NZIPT 800019 (24 August 2011) (New Zealand) paras. 6, 7, 14 and 62-64 [AB (New 
Zealand)]; and 73894 et al. (New Zealand), note 125 above, paras. 35, 43 and 97-104.  
183 Baillot et. al. ‘Gaps’, note 170 above, 2 and 21-22. See also N (UK), note 148 above, para. 57, in which the 
only issue considered was whether the Appellant would be able to access treatment for HIV, but not the fact 
that she had been kidnapped by the Lord’s Resistance Army and then raped by government soldiers. 
184 1002652 [2010] RRTA 557 (15 July 2010) (Australia) para. 68 [1002652 (Australia)]; TA8-00963 [2009] RPDD 
No. 395 (22 September 2009) (Canada), para. 7 [TA8-00963 (Canada)]; TA8-18792 [2010] RPDD No. 374 (17 
June 2010) (Canada), para. 36 [TA8-18792 (Canada)]; VA9-00148 (Canada), note 125 above, para. 20; Kika 
(Canada), note 125 above, para. 9; PS (UK), note 125 above, para. 7; Camara v Attorney General [2009] 580 F.3d 
196 (4 September 2009) (US), 8 [Camara (US)]; SS (UK), note 125 above, 16; and Gomez v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 947 F.d 660; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25697 (28 October 1991) (US), 664 [Gomez (US)]. 
185 VA9-00148 (Canada), note 125 above, para. 10. 
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tortured, and the applicant was raped.186 The rebels stole $40,000 and took her husband and 
step-son - she has not seen them since.187 The rebel violence subsequently increased, and her 
neighbor and her children were beheaded, while others had body parts amputated or were 
killed.188 While the adjudicator found that a nexus to a Convention ground does exist due to 
the sexual violence, he characterized the beatings, rape and torture of her and her family as 
“localized crime” and, even if the rebels had targeted them, it was for money and not for any 
other reason.189 This led to a decision that, “[a]lthough conditions in the DRC certainly 
involve a degree of risk and violence”, the applicant and her family would not face a 
personalized risk to their lives if returned.190 This decision is particularly striking in that it 
lacks any consideration of the significant political and ethnic dimensions of the conflict in the 
DRC, including the political and ethnic choices by the various rebel groups of where, how 
and who they attack. 191  As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam note: “A closer look at the 
background to the conflict … and the ways in which it was fought, will often establish a link 
to the [Refugee] Convention.”192 
The classification of gender-related ill-treatment in conflict as indiscriminate leads to the 
assumption that the applicant was not personally targeted for past persecution, and/or that 
she can be returned to her country of origin because any future risk she would face is a risk 
faced by everyone in that country. While the facts of every case are individual, these 
underlying assumptions can legitimately be questioned. On the issue of personal targeting, it 
is crucial that decision-makers examine both the narrow and the wider context in which the 
violations occurred. In the case of VA9-00148 outlined above, the narrow focus reveals a 
potential case of targeting: the applicant was raped during the rebel attack, while her 
husband and son were abducted.193 Both forms of mistreatment are gendered: the applicant 
may have been targeted for rape because she was female,194 while the men may have been 
                                                 
186 Ibid.  
187 Ibid.  
188 Ibid.  
189 Ibid., paras. 15 and 16. 
190 Ibid., para. 20. 
191  There are numerous reports by international and nongovernmental organizations detailing varying 
political and ethnic reasons for militia violence. For example, on motives for sexual violence by the Mai Mai, 
see: J. Kelly, “Rape in War: Motives of Militia in DRC” (June 2010, United States Institute of Peace) at 
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR243Kelly.pdf. The adjudicator did not appear to refer to any country 
of origin information in making this decision. 
192 G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 
3rd ed., 2007), 126 [Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee]. 
193 VA9-00148 (Canada), note 125 above, para. 10. 
194 There are many layers to this: she may have been targeted for rape because she is of the female sex (and 
therefore has the genitalia to rape); because of her gender (for example, due to patriarchal assumptions by 
the perpetrators that women are there to serve the needs of men); to punish her in a psychological and 
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targeted for abduction because they are men (perhaps to become forced fighters). As well, if 
one examined the wider context of militia movements in the area in the applicant’s area at 
the time of the attack,195 one might be able to discern other cross-cutting ways in which the 
applicant and her family were targeted – perhaps due to the (presumed) ethnicity or 
(presumed) political affiliation of the individuals in that area. These narrow and wider 
inquiries into the conflict would also inform analysis of the risk of future targeting for 
gender-related persecution (including persecution of a different type than originally 
suffered).196 These deeper inquiries – both gender-sensitive and intersectional - are crucial to 
more accurately determining whether violence is indiscriminate or targeted.  
5  LESSONS LEARNED 
During war, gender norms often take on even greater socio-political significance than during 
peacetime: for example, “the role of women in the biological and social reproduction of 
group identity places them in a position of particular vulnerability.”197 Thus, gender-related 
acts in conflict, such as the rape of women and girls, often take on deeper meanings or have 
broader repercussions (for families, for communities), thereby creating differentiated 
experiences. However, the significance of these meanings or repercussions “are currently 
rarely recognized in the asylum determination process.”198 This is evidenced by the common 
obstacles faced by women and girls in proving that they were persecuted in gender-related 
ways in the past and/or that they risk gender-related persecution in the future. Within rape 
claims, there are continuing difficulties with the incorrect characterization of rape in conflict 
as a ‘private’ act. As well, not enough attention is paid to the after-effects of past rape in 
creating future risks of persecution. While the case set did not shed much light on other 
types of ill-treatment that might be considered as gender-related persecution, international 
refugee and criminal law do provide some guidance – for example, identifying sexual 
slavery. Yet, there are many more forms, because seemingly gender-neutral persecutory acts 
can be carried out through gendered means or have gender-specific effects. This requires 
refugee decision-makers to listen carefully for, and draw out, gender-related ill-treatment, 
                                                                                                                                                 
physical manner without the use of physical weapons; to humiliate her male family members (that they 
cannot protect her, that the enemy has power); and/or to humiliate her community. 
195 This requires detailed country of origin information. For more on this, see Part 6.1 below. 
196 E.g., AA (Uganda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 579 (22 May 2008) (UK), 4 
[AA (UK)], in which in humanitarian protection (but not refugee status) was granted to the applicant based 
on a future risk that the applicant (originally from Northern Uganda and a victim of rape) would be forced 
into prostitution if returned to Kampala: “Even if it is the fate of many of her countrywomen, I cannot think 
that either the AIT or the House of Lords that decided AH(Sudan) would have felt able to regard enforced 
prostitution as coming within the category of normal country conditions that the refugee must be expected 
to put up with.” 
197 Crawley, Refugees and Gender, note 21 above, 88. 
198 Ibid. This comment is from 2001, but the analysis in this Part demonstrates that it is still applicable.  
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while at the same time respecting that women may identify harm in gender-differentiated 
ways. Unfortunately, the case set suggests that this careful listening is not always happening. 
Another, rather significant, obstacle is that a number of decision-makers classify gender-
related violence as part of the general indiscriminate consequences of conflict. It appears that 
this is done without necessarily considering potential gender-related reasons for targeting 
(for example, the various ways in which rape is used as a weapon of war) or the wider 
political and other dimensions of the conflict. If this contextual and gender-sensitive analysis 
is done, it is suggested that fewer cases of gender-related ill-treatment would be categorized 
as untargeted.199  
IV  CONVENTION GROUNDS  
Under the Refugee Convention, only those who can demonstrate “well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion” can qualify as refugees.200 As gender is not explicitly listed as a 
persecutory ground, women and girls fleeing conflict for gender-related reasons must fit 
their claims within one of the other grounds.201 There are many different ways in which 
gender relates to the Convention grounds. If the persecutor would not have persecuted the 
victim had the victim not been female, “then an inference may be drawn that one of the 
motivations for persecution was the victim’s gender.”202 For example, a party to a conflict 
may impose specific forms of conformity on women and girls based on a particular 
ideological view of how they should act.203 When the reason underlying the persecution is 
the victim’s gender, then “membership of a particular social group” may be the best 
                                                 
199 This does not directly answer the question of whether violence directed against women and girls during 
conflict can ever be described as indiscriminate. The discussion suggests that many more forms of ill-
treatment in conflict may be considered gender-based, and that the fact that the ill-treatment is gendered 
may reflect at least a modicum of targeting of the victim on the basis of gender, sex or both.  
200 Refugee Convention, note 4 above, Art. 1A(2). 
201 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 1 – Gender-Related Persecution’, note 8 above, 
paras. 22-34. Note that ‘sex’ may be relevant as a category: A. Edwards, ‘Distinction, Discretion, 
Discrimination: The New Frontiers of Gender-related Claims to Asylum’, remarks presented at Gender, 
Migration and Human Rights Conference, Florence, Italy (18-19 June 2012) 11, available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4ffd430c2.pdf [Edwards, ‘Distinction’]. Where sex is a factor, gender 
may also simultaneously be a factor. There are often socially-constructed assumptions accompanying the 
choice of biologically female individuals for persecution. Adjudicators should be precise as to whether it is 
sex or gender (or both) intersecting with the Convention grounds. 
202 A. Roberts, ‘Gender and Refugee Law’ (2002) 22 Australian Yearbook of International Law 185. 
203 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, The Refugee, note 193 above, 82. 
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category.204 Where the gender of the victim dictates the manner of persecution (i.e. the 
persecution is carried out in a gender-specific manner, such as through rape and other forms 
of sexual violence, forced marriage, forced abortion, forced sterilization or forced 
pregnancy), but is not necessarily the reason for the persecution itself, then other Convention 
grounds might be more applicable.205 For example, women and girls may be punished in 
gender-specific ways by one party to the conflict, because of support, or perceived support, 
for another party to the conflict. This may be considered as persecution for reasons of actual 
or imputed political opinion. 
1  MEMBERSHIP OF A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
In practice, claims by women and girls tend to be considered under – and, indeed, funneled 
into – the category of “membership of a particular social group” or MPSG.206 The case set 
confirmed this: MPSG was the most common Convention ground, with political opinion, 
race and religion the next most common grounds (in that order). Thus, it appears that the 
conflict-related cases reflect the more general trend in female cases, which suffer from the 
disproportionate use of MPSG.207 
UNHCR has defined “particular social group” as “a group of persons who share a common 
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by 
society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is 
otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.”208 
Within the case set, there were examples in which “women” within a particular country 
                                                 
204 T. Inlender, ‘Status Quo or Sixth Ground? Adjudicating Gender Asylum Claims’ in S. Benhabib and J. 
Resnick, Migrations and Mobilities: Citizenship, Borders, and Gender (New York: New York University Press, 
2009), 359 [Inlender, ‘Status Quo or Sixth Ground’]. 
205 Ibid. 
206 This is the tendency in all claims by women and girls, and not only conflict-related claims: see Querton, ‘I 
Feel Like’, note 19 above, 32; Cheikh et al., note 19 above, 55 and 60; C. Querton, ‘The Interpretation of the 
Convention Ground of ‘Membership in a Particular Social Group’ in the Context of Gender-related Claims 
for Asylum’, Refugee Law Initiative, January 2012, available online at 
http://www.sas.ac.uk/sites/default/files/files/RLI/RLI_Working_Paper_No_3.pdf, 4; and Edwards, 
Transitioning Gender, note 5 above, 28. 
207 Chiekh et al, note 20 above, 55. 
208 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” within the 
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’, 7 
May 2002, HCR/GIP/02/02, available online at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html, para. 11 [UNHCR, 
‘Guidelines on MPSG’]. Note that some countries require both or add an additional requirement: Querton, ‘I 
Feel Like’, note 19 above, 36; Cheikh et al., note 19 above, 62; and Crawley and Lester, note 148 above, para. 
388. 
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were identified as such a group:209 for example, Iraqi,210 Afghani,211 and Somali women.212 
However, in other cases, this category was not considered to provide enough 
differentiation.213 In these other cases, the group was defined both by gender and other 
characteristics: for example, Tamil women whose husbands are missing or dead,214 Afghan 
women and girls related to a particular male,215 lone Somali Ashraf woman with children,216 
widows of former members of the Iraqi Ba’ath party and lone women with children,217 single 
Somali women with children with no clan or family protection,218 and family of senior Iraqi 
government employees with the additional factors of being in a mixed Sunni/Shia marriage 
and having liberal views.219 
The cases studied demonstrate that there are differing approaches as to whether and when it 
is appropriate to adopt the broad category of “women” as a particular social group in a 
given country in conflict. For example, the UK case of HM indicated that women in Somalia 
form a particular social group “not just because they are women, but because they are 
extensively discriminated against.”220 On the other hand, in the UK case of HH & Others, a 
narrower approach was adopted, in order, it appears, to be able to exclude two and accept 
one female claimant. Thus, the analysis did not focus, as it had in HM, on the overarching 
situation of women in Somalia. Rather, the focus was on clans and sub-clans because “[o]n 
the evidence, being a woman, without more, is not a sufficient differentiator” to place her at 
individualized risk on return to a city “which is in a situation of armed conflict”.221 Thus, the 
successful claimant was classified as part of the social group “lone Ashraf woman with 
children”, while the analysis of the others focused on clan (and not gender).222 In this case, 
the narrowness of the social group seemed to be a decision-making device rather than an 
analysis of intersectionality. Intersectionality, in and of itself, can be positive and necessary, 
because it recognizes the lived realities of female members of a society—who are not only 
                                                 
209 UNHCR has indicated that ‘women’ can be a valid group: UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on MPSG’, note 208 
above, para. 12. 
210 1002091 [2010] RRTA 469 (7 June 2010) (Australia), para. 69 [1002091 (Australia)]. 
211 NS (UK), note 125 above, para. 79 
212 HM Somalia [2005] UKIAT 00040 (26 January 2005) (UK) para. 35 [HM (UK)]. 
213 HH (UK), note 180 above, para. 352: “On the evidence, being a woman, without more, is not a sufficient 
differentiator to place her at such risk.” 
214 1203764, note 125 above, para. 85. 
215 JDG (Re) [2007] RPDD No. 33 (10 July 2007) (Canada), para. 133 [JDG (Canada)]. 
216 HH (UK), note 180 above, para. 369. 
217 NA (UK), note 181 above, paras. 93 and 97. 
218 AMM and Others, note 125 above, para. 631. 
219 1110871 [2012] RRTA 131 (6 March 2012) (Australia) paras. 90-91 [1110871 (Australia)]. 
220 HM (UK), note 212 above, para. 35. 
221 HH (UK), note 180 above, para. 352. 
222 Ibid., paras. 349, 355 and 369. 
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female, but are also of a particular age, religion, race, etc.223 However, if one is able to 
establish that a woman is being persecuted because she is a woman, or for reasons of gender, 
then “women” may be the more accurate particular social group.224 
A default to the MPSG category sometimes also means that the nature of the conflict from 
which the applicant is fleeing is not analyzed at all, or not in depth.225 It is not clear from the 
cases why this is so, but it may be because many MPSG gender-related cases typically deal 
with ‘private’ harms in peacetime,226 such as domestic violence, forced marriage and female 
genital mutilation.227 As with these other sorts of harm, sometimes the MPSG analysis in 
conflict-related cases focused closely on the ill-treatment, and less so on the wider (and more 
‘public’) religious, national or political aspects of the conflict and their gendered 
components.228 As a result, potential social groups or other applicable Convention grounds 
may be missed. There is also the concern that conflict-related cases raising non-typical 
gender issues (for example, outside of the realm of sexual violence) may mistakenly be 
considered as not qualifying as MPSG. Within the case set, those decisions that did consider 
the nature of the conflict in some depth tended to be more thorough in their consideration of 
the various facets of MPSG and the other Convention grounds.229 
It is well-accepted that the social group cannot be solely defined by the type of current 
persecution.230 However, it is important to note that this does not mean that the form of 
persecution is irrelevant: those who have suffered past gender-related persecution such as 
rape “are linked by an immutable characteristic which is at once independent of[,] and the 
                                                 
223 For example, the intersection of sex and age in the case of girls can compound the harm suffered: 
Edwards, ‘Age and Gender Dimensions’, note 18 above, 47. For cases involving girls, see Mohammed, note 
125 above; and AA (UK), note 196 above. 
224 Edwards, ‘Distinction’, note 201 above, 10-11. 
225 E.g. MZXQS v. Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 97 (17 February 2009) (Australia) (see 
original decision, para. 24) [MZXQS (Australia)]; 1010754 (Australia), note 183; AHU (Re) [2007] RPDD No. 
189 [AHU (Canada]; TA8-00963 (Canada), note 184 above; VA9-00148 (Canada), note 125 above; Kika 
(Canada), note 125 above (see original decision, para. 9); EB (UK), note 175 above; AA (UK), note 196 above; 
SH (Palestinian Territories) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 1150 (22 October 
2008) (UK) [SH (UK)]; Mohammed, note 126 above; Lopez v Attorney General [2007] 504 F.3d 1341 (25 October 
2007) (US) [Lopez (US)]; Mambwe, note 125 above. 
226 Baillot et al., ‘Gaps’, note 170 above, 6-7. 
227 See note 21 above. 
228 In one case, the analysis changed from being about ill-treatment in conflict to female genital mutilation, 
perhaps because the decision-maker felt it was more well-established as a gender-related form of harm 
falling within MPSG: Mohammed, note 125 above.  
229 1002091 (Australia), note 210 above; 1110871 (Australia), note 219 above; 1203764 (Australia), note 125 
above; JDG (Canada), note 215 above; Camara (US), note 184 above; and Kante, note 125 above. 
230 E.g., In re B (FC) (UK), note 125 above, para. 37; and UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on MPSG’, note 208 above, 
paras. 2 and 14. 
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cause of[,] their current ill-treatment.”231 A characteristic or an attribute expressed visibly 
may reinforce a finding that the individual belongs to a particular social group, but it is not a 
pre-condition for recognition of the group, especially given that those targeted for 
persecution may take pains to remain as invisible as possible.232 Thus, “persecutory action 
toward a group may be a relevant factor in determining the visibility of a group in a 
particular society.”233 This may be of special assistance in cases dealing with gender-related 
harm in conflict because women and girls who suffered war-related sexual violence or were 
conjugal slaves (‘bush wives’) may be stigmatized within society and therefore become part 
of a visible group. That said, some adjudicators seem to struggle with drawing the line 
between when a proposed particular social group is defined improperly by reference to 
conflict-related persecution, and when a past form of conflict-related persecution might be a 
relevant factor in creating visibility for the immutable characteristic.234  
Contrary to these concerns, MPSG may also be a good category in which to analyze the sorts 
of conflict-related social and cultural harms identified by many women as central to their 
persecution.235 This is illustrated, for example, in cases identifying relational social groups, 
especially family.236 That said, women and girls should not be essentialized as solely social 
and cultural beings237 – obviously their lives are complex, and their suffering in conflict is 
also complex. It is for this reason that it is also important to consider the applicability of 
other Convention grounds in conflict-related refugee claims by women and girls. 238 
                                                 
231 In re B (FC) (UK), note 125 above, para. 37.  
232  UNHCR, ‘Matter of Valdiviezo-Galdamez, Amicus Curiae Brief In Support Of Respondent’, 10 August 
2012, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/503653562.html , 17-18. 
233 UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on MPSG’, note 208 above, paras. 2 and 14. This approach was applied in LM 
Congo (UK), note 125 above, para. 111 (applicant’s current vulnerability increased by fact of past rape in 
Congo). 
234 Kante (US), note 125 above, 26-27; and Gomez, note 184 above, 663-664. 
235 Ní Aolaín et al., On the Frontlines, note 33 above, 48 and 154. 
236 MZXQS (Australia), note 225 above, paras. 23-24; 1010754 (Australia), note 182 above, para. 68; 1110871 
(Australia), note 219 above, para. 90; TA3-24983 and TA3-24984 IRB Canada (2 February 2005) (Canada), 6-7 
[TA3-24983 and TA3-24984 (Canada)]. 
237 Edwards, ‘Transitioning Gender’, note 5 above, 27. 
238 The importance of this was demonstrated in some cases in the case set: e.g. NA (UK), note 181 above, 
paras. 91-97, which considered that being an ethnic Palestinian, former member of Ba’ath party and widow 
of former Ba’ath member, an academic and a lone woman with children in Iraq were risk factors (being an 
ethnic Palestinian was enough, but the Immigration Judge looked at other risk factors for completeness). See 
also 1203764 (Australia), note 125 above, para. 85. 
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2 POLITICAL OPINION AND THE REMAINING CONVENTION GROUNDS 
The Convention ground of political opinion is particularly useful in conflict-related claims. 
This was demonstrated in the case set, which contained nine cases in which political opinion 
was seriously considered as an applicable Convention ground. 239  This ground captures 
different ways in which a woman or girl may have political opinion imputed to her by a 
party to the conflict. This may occur when the claimant worked with, or for, a political party 
or a politician in her country of origin: for example, in the UK case of LM Congo, the 
applicant had served as secretary for youth, and in other roles, for an opposition group.240 As 
well, persecutors may impute political opinion based on familial relationships. In the 
Australian case of MZXQS, the applicants claimed a well-founded fear of persecution 
because of their link to their sister, a well-known Tamil opposition Member of Parliament in 
Sri Lanka representing an LTTE-controlled area.241 The original tribunal considered this 
claim as falling under MPSG, and dismissed the claim on this ground.242 The court found 
that the tribunal had incorrectly characterized the claim, which was actually a claim of 
imputed political opinion on the basis of their relationship with their sister.243 In the New 
Zealand case of 73894 et al., the court found that the female applicant was at risk due to the 
political activities of her husband, who helped Rwandan Tutsis flee the DRC.244 Another way 
in which political opinion may be imputed to a woman or a girl is for holding, or appearing 
to hold, views different from those of the warring factions.245 In the UK case of LM Iraq, the 
applicant was perceived by Iraqi militia as supporting or collaborating with the West, in part 
because she was a high-profile working woman who did not wear the hijab at work.246 In 
addition, political opinion has been deemed to be imputed based on racial or ethnic identity: 
in the Australian case of 1203764, the tribunal found that there was a real risk that the 
                                                 
239 MZXQS (Australia), note 225 above; 0901064 (Australia), note 182 above; 1012015 [2011] RRTA 245 (1 
April 2011 (Australia) [1012015 (Australia)]; 1203764 (Australia), note 125 above; TA3-24983 and TA3-24984 
(Canada), note 236 above; 73894 et al. (New Zealand), note 125 above; LM Iraq CG [2006] UKAIT 00060 (26 
July 2006) (UK) [LM Iraq (UK)]; LM Congo (UK), note 125 above; but note Lopez, note 225 above. 
240 LM Congo (UK), note 125 above, para. 107. In this case, the political opinion of the applicant’s political 
superior was imputed to her: para. 114. 
241 MZXQS (Australia), note 225 above, para. 4. 
242 Ibid., para. 11. 
243 Ibid., para. 24. The Tribunal was therefore asked to deal with the political opinion claim: para. 28. 
244 73894 et al. (New Zealand), note 125 above, paras. 5, 32, 102, 103, 106. Similarly, in TA3-24983 and TA3-
24984 (Canada), note 236 above, 1, the applicant was granted refugee status “by reason of her perceived 
political opinion, that being viewed as a non-collaborator by the FARC”, due to the actions of her ex-
partner..  
245 LM Iraq (UK), note 239 above, para. 73. 
246 Ibid., paras. 67, 73 and 75. This was considered as perceived political opinion (rights of Iraqi women): 
para. 73. 
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applicant, a Tamil from the north, would be sexually assaulted or otherwise harmed if she 
returned to Sri Lanka, for reasons of the political opinion imputed to her (membership of or 
sympathy for the LTTE).247  
The applicant herself may not classify her actions as political. It is therefore important for 
refugee decision-makers to recognize when a claim is, in fact, based on political opinion by 
examining the applicant’s actions. For example, in 73894 et al., the female applicant, who was 
from the DRC, indicated that she “has not been interested in politics”.248 However, she and 
her husband disagreed with the government’s policy of persecuting Rwandan Tutsis, and 
the applicant therefore helped to shelter Rwandan Tutsis (while her husband helped them to 
flee).249 The Refugee Status Appeals Authority characterized this as “an overt political act 
opposing the policies of the Kabila regime.”250 As a result of her actions and those of her 
husband, her home was searched several times and the female members of her family were 
raped and sexually abused.251 Despite the conclusion that sheltering Rwandan Tutsis was a 
political act, the Authority felt that the applicant’s case was derivative of her husband’s and 
based its grant of refugee status on imputed political opinion (due to her husband’s actions) 
as a result.252  
Women’s political activity during conflict may take forms different from that associated with 
male political activity – and the political activity by women needs to be recognized as such. 
In the US case of Lopez, the applicant joined the Colombian Liberal Party, providing 
humanitarian assistance to residents of poor communities and conducting seminars on the 
principles of the Liberal Movement.253  She was subsequently attacked by the FARC in 
retaliation for these activities.254 The Immigration Judge found that these activities were 
“community-based and not political in nature”, and therefore the Convention ground of 
political opinion did not apply. 255  This categorization of women’s political activities as 
something other than political – such as community work – is also recognized to be a serious 
problem for non-conflict-related female refugee claims.256 
                                                 
247 1203764 (Australia), note 125 above, para. 84. See also 1012015 (Australia), para. 239 above. 
248 73894 et al. (New Zealand), note 125 above, para. 15. 
249 Ibid., paras. 95 and 96. 
250 Ibid., para. 96. 
251 Ibid., para. 41, 45. 
252 Ibid., paras. 100-104. The grant of status is found in para. 106. There appears to be a typographical error in 
the first sentence of para. 106, as the second sentence refers to a grant of refugee status. 
253 Lopez, note 225 above, 1343. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid., 1344. Petition for review on this point not granted. 
256 Crawley, Refugees and Gender, note 21, 79-83. 
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Finally, the cases in the case set demonstrated that, in the context of racially- or religiously-
motivated conflicts, the Convention grounds of race and religion are particularly helpful.257 
While the Convention ground of nationality was not represented in the case set, it also 
would be a useful ground in the context of nationality-driven conflicts.  
3  LESSONS LEARNED 
This Part has explored the hazards associated with over-reliance on MPSG in cases dealing 
with both gender and conflict, such as a tendency toward creating artificial sub-groups of 
women rather than rely on “women” generally.258 As well, there appears to be a focus on the 
‘private’ side of the gender-related harms, to the detriment of an analysis of the nature of the 
conflict. On the other hand, there are benefits to using MPSG, as it is suited to drawing 
attention to social and cultural harms. It is also important for adjudicators to avoid an 
automatic reliance on MPSG and instead consider the other Convention grounds, especially 
political opinion. On political opinion, while this appears to be a particularly helpful ground 
in conflict-related cases, at least one case illustrated that it is crucial that adjudicators realize 
that female political activity may not always look like ‘standard’ male political activity. Race, 
religion and nationality may also be useful grounds when considering cases stemming from 
racial, religious or nationality-driven conflicts. 
V   LACK OF STATE PROTECTION 
When adjudicators evaluate the risk of future persecution in gender-related claims, one issue 
they assess is whether the applicant can benefit from State protection against the actions of 
non-State actors. The case set revealed some gender-sensitive analysis of whether or not 
State protection is available, especially consideration of the dangers faced by a lone woman 
(sometimes with children) returning to a conflict-ridden society rife with discrimination 
against women, in which women (and girls) may be common targets for gender-related 
violence (such as rape, forced prostitution and trafficking).259 However, there were also 
disturbing examples of non-sensitivity. In the UK case of PS, the second immigration judge 
                                                 
257 On race, see 1203764 (Australia), note 125 above, para. 85; NA (UK), note 181, para. 91; on religion, see 
JXV (Canada), note 125 above, para. 89. 
258 Edwards, ‘Distinction’, note 201 above, 10. 
259 E.g. NA (UK), note 181 above, paras. 97-98; AA (UK), note 196, 1; and AMM and Others, note 125 above, 
para. 631. See also Judgment W 2 K 11.30330, Administrative Court of Würzburg (Germany), 16 February 
2012, available online (in German) at http://www.asyl.net/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumente/19769.pdf , in 
which the fact that a woman was single and lacked protection of a male family member led to a serious and 
individual threat for the applicant in Afghanistan and there was no meaningful internal protection 
alternative. 
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found that the Tamil applicant’s rapists, despite being Sri Lankan soldiers, were “rogue” and 
comparable to “three civilian criminals”. 260 The judge concluded that there was no threat of 
future persecution, and that, in the event the applicant had difficulties from them again, she 
could seek State protection in the government-controlled area since the soldiers’ actions were 
not sanctioned by the Sri Lankan government.261 This was overturned on appeal, with the 
judges finding that “[t]he whole point was that, unlike ordinary criminals, the soldiers were 
in a position to commit and repeat their crime with no apparent prospect of detection or 
punishment.” 262  The lesson from this case is that the analysis of future risk must be 
undertaken in a gender-sensitive manner with a full appreciation of the nature of the 
conflict, including whether the State permits impunity for gender-related violations. 
One key issue arising in the cases in this study related to the impact the end of a conflict had 
on consideration of the risk of future persecution and State protection. This is demonstrated 
in the US case of Mambwe, in which the end of the civil war in Angola was considered to 
eliminate any future risk of persecution.263 This was despite the applicant’s assertion that the 
civil war “was not put to rest” by the peace accord and disarmament of UNITA.264 Rather 
than consider persecutory risks in Angola facing young female rape victims of UNITA with 
a child by rape who have no relatives, the court instead only considered whether UNITA is 
still a military threat.265 Thus, State protection from sources of persecution other than UNITA 
were not considered, even though she is likely to face severe societal stigma from those on 
both sides of the conflict.266 It is important to recognize that the timelines of persecution do 
not necessarily accord with the timeline of cease-fires or peace agreements: “Regime changes 
may be less effective in protecting women from such dangers [as rape] than they are for 
men”.267  The Canadian Guidelines correctly state: “A change in country circumstances, 
generally viewed as a positive change, may have no impact, or even a negative impact, on a 
woman’s fear of gender-related persecution.”268 Peace processes may marginalize women’s 
concerns and may not touch deep-seated discrimination directed against women and girls.269 
When considering risk of future persecution in cases where conflict has ceased, it is relevant 
                                                 
260 PS (UK), note 125 above, para. 7. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid., para. 8. 
263 Mambwe (US), note 125 above, 4. 
264 Ibid.  
265 Ibid., 4-5. 
266 See also AA (UK), note 196 above, 4, noting that the future persecution feared (in this case, forced 
prostitution) can be of a different category from that on which the original claim was based. 
267 N (UK), note 148 above, para. 58. 
268 Canada, ‘Guidelines’, note 12 above, s. C(3) ‘Evidentiary Matters’. 
269 Ní Aolaín et al., On the Frontlines, note 33 above, 46. 
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for an adjudicator to consider whether conflict-related sexual violence has been addressed in 
any cease-fire or peace agreement in the country of origin:270 if it has not, then this is a 
potential indicator of State unwillingness to counter sexual violence.  
VI  PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY ISSUES 
As Crawley notes, procedural and evidential barriers “often inhibit women’s access to the 
determination process and may serve to limit the quality of information gathered about the 
claim and, in turn, the quality of the decision-making process.”271 This proved true in the 
cases reviewed in the case set. The most challenging issue arising in conflict- and gender-
related claims appears to be lack of gender-sensitive country of origin information, followed 
closely by inability to establish credibility.  
1  COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION 
The lack of gender-sensitive country of origin information is an overarching problem 
affecting all gender-related claims,272 but the problem seems to be compounded in conflict-
related claims. Where there was adequate gender- and conflict-related country of origin 
information available to decision-makers, the analysis of the cases tended to be more 
thorough and sensitive.273 Where such information seemed to be lacking, the analysis was 
less thorough and more speculative, and the female applicants had serious difficulties 
proving their cases.274  
Female claimants typically would benefit from: pre-conflict information on the legal, 
political, social, cultural and economic position of women and girls and consequences for 
non-adherence to socio-cultural gender norms, information on how these aspects have 
changed for women and girls during the conflict, the incidence and forms of reported 
                                                 
270 For examples of how this might be done, see UNDPA, “Guidance for Mediators’, note 28 above. 
271 Crawley, Refugees and Gender, note 21 above, 199. 
272 Querton, ‘I Felt Like’, note 19 above, 32; HRW, ‘Fast-Tracked’, note 19 above, 44 and 47-48; Crawley and 
Lester, note 148 above, para. 653; Cheikh et al., note 19 above, 89; H. Crawley, ‘Thematic Review on the 
Coverage of Women in Country of Origin Information (COI) Reports’, 19 September 2011, available online 
at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Evaluation-of-the-Country-of-Origin-
Report-on-Women3.pdf ,133-144 [Crawley, ‘COI’]. 
273 E.g., 110871 (Australia), note 219 above, para. 86; NS (UK), note 125 above, 10-17; LM Iraq (UK), note 239 
above, paras. 38-39 and 63-64; HH (UK), note 180 above, 187, 188 and 192; NA (UK), note 181 above, paras. 
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above; Kika (Canada), note 125 above; Lopez (US), note 225 above; Camara (US), note 184 above; and Kante 
(US), note 125 above. 
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violence (in both the private and public spheres) against women and girls pre-conflict and 
during conflict, the protection available to them during conflict or post-conflict, any 
penalties imposed on those who perpetrate the violence, and detailed information about the 
nature of the conflict and the parties to the conflict.275 It is not always possible to collect this 
information on countries at peace, but getting accurate, up-to-date information on the 
situation of women and girls during a conflict can be extremely difficult, and if it is collected, 
it likely reflects under-reporting and therefore under-estimation.276 
The cases in the case set tended to rely on specific types of country of origin information, 
especially from UNHCR, 277  so it is crucial that UNHCR continue to provide as much 
guidance in this respect as possible. 278  Other sources included international 
nongovernmental organizations279 and certain United Nations reports.280 There is certainly 
scope for improving country of origin information on both gender and conflict issues to 
include a wider range of UN documents, such as Security Council resolutions referring to 
gender-related ill-treatment, 281  reports of the UN Secretary-General written pursuant to 
Security Council resolution 1889 and its indicators,282 UN Secretary-General reports pursuant 
to resolution 1960 283  and other UN reports providing qualitative and quantitative 
information on women and girls in conflict settings. As well, reports from other international 
organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, 284  should be 
considered. Decisions or judgments of international criminal tribunals might also be 
                                                 
275 Ní Aolaín et al., On the Frontlines, supra note 33 at 45-46; Crawley, ‘COI’, note 272 above, 133-134. 
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Seekers from Côte d’Ivoire’, 15 June 2012, HCR/EG/CIV/12/01, available online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4fa7c1c92.html, 28-32.  
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these indicators in his reports: e.g., Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Women and Peace and 
Security’, 29 September 2011, S/2011/598 (2011). 
283 The Secretary-General’s reports pursuant to Resolution 1960 include a discussion of conflicts in which 
sexual violence has been documented: Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, ‘Conflict-related 
sexual violence,’ 13 January 2012, S/2012/33, paras 17-57 and Annex. 
284 E.g. ICRC, ‘Women Facing War’, note 87 above. 
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helpful. 285  Finally, reports from international and domestic nongovernmental women’s 
organizations (including those located in the country of origin) should be considered.286 All 
refugee-receiving countries should aim to systematically collect and make available to 
applicants and their representatives up-to-date and accurate information on the situation 
and experiences of women and girls, including in conflict.287 As well, where there is a lack of 
information, decision-makers should be cautioned against drawing speculative conclusions 
or assuming lack of persecution.288 
2  CREDIBILITY 
The second most challenging issue relates to credibility. Within the case set, a number of 
claims were not accepted due to rulings of lack of credibility, either at the initial stages or on 
appeal.289 This was due to a number of factors, most often inconsistencies290 or perceived 
implausibilities in testimony, ‘incorrect’ demeanor (for example, being matter-of-fact when 
the adjudicator expects an applicant to be distressed),291 or lack of corroborative country of 
origin information. When found credible, it was often due to a combination of ‘correct’ 
demeanor,292 relative consistency in the applicant’s story293 and corroborative country of 
                                                 
285 However, their utility may be limited given the length of time between arrest and judgment, and the 
prospective nature of the refugee test: UNHCR, ‘Complementarities between International Refugee Law, 
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(UK), note 180 above;  AMM and Others, note 125 above; Mohammed (US), note 125 above (at initial stage); 
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reasons for giving unclear evidence about rape, but felt that the applicant’s inconsistencies were too large: 
BK (UK), note 125 above, paras. 524 and 527. 
291  E.g. Refugee Appeal No. 75410 (7 March 2005) (New Zealand) [75410 (New Zealand)], the applicant 
presented evidence about her fiancé’s disappearance in a matter-of-fact manner, but the adjudicator felt that 
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292 E.g., 1110871 (Australia), note 219 above, para. 86; and TA3-24983 and TA3-24984 (Canada), note 236 
above, 4 (gave evidence in a straightforward and consistent manner). 
293 Complete consistency is not expected: 0901064 (Australia), note 182 above, para. 63. 
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origin information.294 The case set mirrors concerns expressed about similar experiences with 
claims by women and girls more generally.295 For example, previous studies have shown 
that a majority of female claimants are simply not believed at first instance.296 This is due to 
many factors: a hostile environment negatively affecting how detailed the applicant can be in 
explaining her case; 297  undue concentration on perceived inconsistencies without 
consideration for the impact of trauma and dislocation on memory or for culturally different 
ways of expression;298 disincentives for women and girls to reveal sexual violence (due to 
being traumatized, feelings of shame, or fear of stigma) with late disclosure of sexual 
violence sometimes being held against the applicant, 299  difficulty in evidencing gender-
specific forms of harm and the absence of State protection;300 and incorrect assumptions 
about the meaning of an applicant’s demeanor.301 Credibility findings are clearly affected by 
gender-insensitive refugee claim processes and procedures. 
3  LESSONS LEARNED 
The case set revealed two major problems facing women and girls making refugee claims 
based on a combination of gender- and conflict-related harm. The first challenge for these 
applicants was in accessing and presenting accurate and up-to-date country of origin 
information containing relevant facts about the conflict and its gender dimensions. The 
second difficulty was in establishing credibility in the claim procedure. These problems are 
not specific to conflict-related claims, but the fact that the claim involves conflict may make it 
even more difficult to access reliable and gender-sensitive country information. Conflict-
related trauma may compound this lack of access to information, making it more difficult to 
establish credibility. There have been many recent studies outlining proposed improvements 
to domestic refugee determinations processes involving either women and girls, or gender-
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based claims more generally.302 If implemented, such improvements are likely to positively 
impact conflict-related claims. That said, (more) conflict-specific guidance for decision-
makers might be necessary, especially with respect to the issues of establishing credibility 
and providing evidence. 
VII  CONCLUSIONS 
Women and girls fleeing conflict clearly face a number of obstacles to presenting a successful 
claim for refugee status. These obstacles are similar to those faced by female claimants 
fleeing peacetime, but are compounded in conflict-related cases. Part 2 examined the 
character and effects of conflict on women and girls, demonstrating that, while individual 
experiences will vary, there are common threads. These common threads mean that, while 
women and girls may suffer from similar deprivations and violations as men and boys, their 
experiences of conflict may be different due to the underlying effects of gender 
discrimination. In addition, there are ways in which women and girls may be targeted for ill-
treatment that is different from that faced by men and boys.  
This study began by asking three questions: can violence directed against women and girls 
during conflict ever be described as indiscriminate (and therefore not persecutory for the 
purposes of the Refugee Convention); on what legal basis, if any, could a woman or girl 
fleeing conflict meet the definition of ‘refugee’; and what problems do women and girls 
fleeing conflict face when making refugee claims, and are these problems different from 
those faced by female claimants fleeing peacetime ill-treatment?  
The question of whether violence directed against women and girls during conflict can ever 
be described as indiscriminate falls directly within the adjudicator’s consideration of the 
applicant’s claim of persecution. In Part 3, this study found that a number of decision-
makers classify gender-related violence as part of the general indiscriminate consequences of 
conflict, and therefore not targeted enough to amount to past persecution or present a risk 
for future persecution. This study also considered that refugee decision-makers may be less 
likely to classify such violence as untargeted if they have an in-depth understanding of both 
the gendered nature of the conflict and the nature of gender-related discrimination before, 
during and after the conflict. Plainly, this points to the need for better and more 
standardized dissemination of gender-sensitive country of origin information, including 
information on the treatment of women and girls in that country’s conflict. The fact that a 
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form of ill-treatment is gendered may demonstrate that an individual was targeted as a 
woman or a girl in that conflict, which then raises the question of whether this sort of 
targeting always – or only sometimes – rises to the level required. Thus, the preliminary 
answer to the question is that, while it is not clear whether there are forms of gender-related 
ill-treatment in conflict that may properly be considered to be indiscriminate, it is evident 
that more cases of such ill-treatment should be considered as targeted (rather than 
indiscriminate) than is currently the case.  
The question of the legal basis, if any, on which a woman or girl fleeing conflict can meet the 
definition of ‘refugee’, was considered in Parts 3, 4 and 5. Part 3 found that some forms of 
gender-related ill-treatment in conflict have been found to amount to persecution, especially 
rape. And yet, many applicants have difficulty establishing conflict-related rape as 
persecution for two reasons: first, some adjudicators incorrectly characterize rape in conflict 
as a ‘private’ act and therefore outside the realm of persecution; and second, not enough 
attention is paid by decision-makers to the after-effects of past rape in creating related yet 
different future risks of persecution. Another challenge relates to the current relatively 
narrow perception of what qualifies as a gender-related form of persecution in conflict. Rape 
and other forms of sexual violence are recognized, but it is less common for decision-makers 
to recognize non-sexual gendered violations and seemingly gender-neutral acts (like 
enslavement) carried out through gendered means or having gender-specific effects. In other 
words, there are currently certain obstacles that may make it more difficult than it should be 
for a female claimant fleeing conflict to prove that she has a well-founded fear of 
persecution. Refugee decision-makers should listen more carefully for, and draw out, 
gender-related ill-treatment, while at the same time respecting that women may identify 
harm in gender-differentiated ways. 
Part 4 continued the discussion of obstacles, this time in relation to the Convention grounds. 
As with all gender-related claims, there is a tendency for adjudicators to rely on MPSG as the 
main ground for analysis. The use of MPSG can be useful, but it can also be problematic. For 
example, while some decision-makers have accepted that ‘women’ can be a valid particular 
social group, others create narrower, sometimes artificial, sub-groups, which can distort the 
resulting analysis. As well, some adjudicators seem to focus on the ‘private’ side of the 
gender-related harms, to the detriment of an analysis of the nature of the conflict. These 
obstacles may be overcome with a more fulsome focus on the other Convention grounds. 
Political opinion may in fact be the most useful and applicable ground for analysis, given the 
extreme politics inherent in conflict. As well, the remaining grounds may also be helpful 
when considering cases stemming from racial, religious or nationality-driven conflicts. 
Again, these findings pointed to the importance of ensuring that all those involved in the 
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refugee determination process have access to, and use, gender-sensitive country of origin 
information, including information on the nature of the conflict. 
Part 5 considered obstacles – and possibilities – arising with the consideration of whether or 
not there is State protection in the country of origin. There is some positive case law 
considering the risks to lone females returning to conflict-affected countries of origin. On the 
other hand, there are also cases that failed to understand the actual vulnerabilities of women 
and girls in conflict in relation to their own State. As well, there is some positive case law 
recognizing that a cease-fire or peace agreement does not necessarily mean the end of 
gender-related persecution in a country of origin, but there is also case law demonstrating 
that some decision-makers do not pay enough attention to the actual post-conflict 
circumstances of women and girls. These findings confirmed that women and girls fleeing 
conflict may face more difficulties than they should in demonstrating lack of State protection 
and risk for future persecution.  
Finally, while the question of problems women and girls fleeing conflict face when making 
refugee claims was explored, in part, through the answers to the questions above, it was also 
considered in Part 6. That Part examined procedural and evidentiary difficulties arising in 
conflict- and gender-related claims. Women and girls face significant hurdles in accessing 
and presenting accurate and up-to-date country of origin information containing relevant 
information on the conflict and its gender dimensions. They also often encountered 
problems establishing their credibility in the claim procedure. Sometimes this was because 
they did not have relevant country of origin information to corroborate their stories; 
sometimes it was because they reacted differently than a decision-maker expected and 
sometimes it was because they were not consistent in their stories. Some decision-makers 
took into account the effects of conflict-related trauma on memory or demeanor, but others 
did not. The discussion in Part 6 illustrated that claims that were both gender- and conflict-
related faced many of the same difficulties faced by gender-related claims stemming from 
peacetime: access to helpful country of origin information and establishing credibility. 
However, these problems may be compounded by the fact of the conflict: the complex 
layering of harms in conflict may create deep trauma and therefore difficulties in presenting 
a claim in a coherent and consistent manner, and the conflict may prevent the gathering of 
gender-sensitive information helpful in supporting a gender-related refugee claim. The 
procedural and evidentiary recommendations already made in the current literature on how 
to improve the domestic refugee claim process for women and girls are very important, and 
just as applicable, for the sub-category of conflict-related claims. In addition, it may be 
helpful to provide decision-makers with conflict-specific procedural and evidentiary 
guidance. 
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In conclusion, while there are welcome developments in international and domestic refugee 
law under which claims by women and girls fleeing conflict have been accepted, there is also 
much room for improvement. There is a need for a deeper understanding of gender-related 
persecution, such that seemingly indiscriminate, and/or seemingly gender-neutral, ill-
treatment of women and girls is more correctly recognized as persecution. There is also a 
need for expanded conceptions of the Convention grounds as they relate to women and girls 
fleeing conflict. Finally, while women and girls fleeing conflict face problems similar to those 
making peacetime-related claims, they may also face specific conflict-related evidentiary and 
credibility-related hurdles. These hurdles might be (partly) removed by implementing 
gender-related improvements already recommended in other studies to all gender-related 
claims, but it may be necessary for decision-makers to be provided with (more) conflict- and 
gender-specific guidance on credibility and evidence. Finally, there is also a need for deeper 
study of the experiences of female applicants putting forward joint gender- and conflict-
related refugee claims: it may well be that they face even more significant barriers than have 
yet been identified. 
 
 
